5 It’s not the economy, stupid!
Neoliberalism and right-wing populism go hand in hand.
(Butterwege 2002: 918)
All the great patriots and nationalists in Europe are merely Trojan horses of Big Business. (Thompson 2000: 98)
5.1 Introduction
The academic literature on the populist radical right puts strong emphasis on the alleged neoliberal economic program of the party family. Accord- ing to numerous authors, neoliberal economics is an essential feature of the parties’ ideology and success. At first sight, it is not surprising that the populist radical right is linked to neoliberal economics. After all, con- temporary understanding of “the right” in (empirical) political science is first and foremost in economic terms, standing for a trust in the market over the state, i.e. neoliberal economics (see also 1.5).
Few scholars have provided substantial empirical evidence for the alleged neoliberal content of the socioeconomic programs of the pop- ulist radical right. In fact, as is so often the case in the field, the claim is just assumed to be correct and broadly accepted. However, systematic analysis does not substantiate these claims; even in their early days most populist radical right parties at best expressed neoliberal rhetoric without fronting a consistent neoliberal program. Could it be that the populist radical right parties were just trying to fit the neoliberal Zeitgeist of the 1980s? Does the populist radical right actually share a coherent and col- lective (socio)economic program? And, if so, is this a core feature of their ideology?
In this chapter, the thesis that neoliberal economics constitutes a defin- ing element of the populist radical right is rejected on the basis of two empirical arguments: (1) many key representatives of the party family do not hold neoliberal views on the economy; (2) the economic program is a secondary feature in the ideologies of populist radical right parties. In
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fact, it is also secondary to their electorates. Most of the time, populist radical right parties use their economic program to put into practice their core ideological positions (nativism, authoritarianism, and populism) and to expand their electorate.
5.2 The secondary literature: neoliberal dominance
At least until the beginning of the twenty-first century, the academic literature was dominated by the conventional wisdom that populist radical right parties espouse a neoliberal economic program. Indeed, for many authors neoliberalism was one of the core features of the populist radical right program and one of the main reasons for their electoral success. While this view was initially popularized by Hans-Georg Betz, Herbert Kitschelt developed it into a comprehensive conceptual and theoretical model. Largely due to the influence of these two leading scholars, the predominance of neoliberal economics in the ideology and success of populist radical right parties has become an established fact in much of the literature, irrespective of language or (sub)discipline (e.g. Ho ̈belt 2003; Jungerstam-Mulders 2003; Thompson 2000).
Interestingly, both Betz and Kitschelt are German scholars, who made most of their respective careers in the United States and came to the study of the populist radical right after studying the Greens. To different degrees, they see the populist radical right as the antithesis of the Greens, i.e. a right-wing (partly) materialist backlash against a left-wing postma- terialism. Consequently, neoliberal economics features very prominently in the primary works of both scholars on the topic. Betz identifies one of two subtypes of radical right-wing populism as “neoliberal populism” (1994: 108), while Kitschelt’s famous “winning formula” is a combina- tion of “extreme and economically [speaking] rightists, free-marketeering as well as politically and culturally authoritarian positions” (Kitschelt & McGann 1995: vii). For both scholars this economic program is also a key reason for the electoral success of populist radical right parties, although
1
1 Inrecentwork,Kitschelthas(somewhathalf-heartedly)moderatedhisposition:“While the Kitschelt ‘winning formula’ fits our two cases well, it is necessary to amend it to take account of the softening of the neoliberalism of many new radical right parties during the 1990s. It is probable that the ‘winning formula’ does not require a consistent neoliberalism, but rather a compromise that is sufficiently free-market to appeal to petty bourgeois voters, but does not alienate working-class support by attacking the welfare state too vigorously, while at the same time promising protectionism favorable to both” (McGann & Kitschelt 2005: 163–4; also Kitschelt 2004).
this is most explicit and elaborated in Kitschelt’s theory. More recently, some authors have qualified the predominance of
2
neoliberal economics within the populist radical right.
self had already noted that “[w]ith a few notable exceptions, starting at the end of the 1980s, national populist elements have increasingly come to predominate over neoliberal ones” (1994: 108). According to oth- ers, there was nothing new about this. They argued that the economic program of populist radical right parties like the FN or VB had always included nonliberal elements (e.g. Eatwell 2003; Bastow 1997), or that neoliberalism had never been more than a rhetorical veneer over an essen- tially welfare chauvinist program (e.g. Mudde 2000a).
Some authors, particularly within the German literature, have come to recognize two distinct socioeconomic directions within “the extreme right,” i.e. the neoliberal program of the (alleged) “new” parties, such as the REP, and the national-social(ist) program of the “old” parties, such as the DVU and the NPD (e.g. Ptak 1999; Backes 1996). Although important differences exist regarding the categorization of parties and the details of the socioeconomic programs, this distinction comes quite close to that made by Ignazi (1992), i.e. between the “old” (in 2003: “tradi- tional”) and the “new” (in 2003: “postindustrial”) extreme right, and that of Kitschelt and McGann (1995), between the “new radical right” and “welfare chauvinist” parties. The basis of all these distinctions is that “new” right-wing extremists (in our terms: populist radical rightists) are neoliberal and thus successful, whereas “old” right-wing extremists (in our terms: the extreme right) are welfare chauvinist (or literally national- socialist) and therefore unsuccessful.
The predominance of the neoliberal perspective has led to some remarkable conclusions, especially with regard to Eastern Europe. Radoslaw Markowski, representing the view of many scholars in the region, concludes that populist radical right parties in Central and East- ern European countries (CEECs) are fundamentally different from those in the West. Referring explicitly to Kitschelt’s terminology, he states that “there is no single party that resembles the New Radical Right of the West. All of these CEECs parties are definitely opting for state protectionism and economically leftist ideas. Neoliberal stances are totally missing” (Markowski 2002: 28; see also Thieme 2005; Butterwege 2002). This conclusion is largely correct with respect to the socioeconomic program
2 Assoofteninavibrantfieldofstudy,someofthepointsinthischapterhavebeenmade in recent studies that appeared while I was working on my book. This is most strongly the case in the very interesting recent book chapter by Steffen Kaillitz (2005), which I only managed to read during my revisions. However, I do believe that this chapter still adds some further elaboration, both empirically and theoretically, to his work and that of other colleagues.
In fact, Betz him-
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of the parties in the East, but it also erroneously accepts the flawed inter- pretation of the parties in the West.
5.3 The primary literature: nativist economics
At first sight, the predominance of neoliberalism in the secondary liter-
ature seems to be confirmed by the parties themselves. Many referred
positively to “neoliberal economics” or “free market economics,” at least
throughout the 1980s. Jean-Marie Le Pen, for example, claimed to be
a Reaganite avant la lettre, having developed the economic program two
years before it made the former US president famous (Bastow 1997: 61).
Similarly, the magazines of the VB would hold Reagan and Thatcher up
as icons in the 1980s (e.g. Mudde 2000a), while the (then Czechoslovak)
ˇ
SPR-RSC presented itself as the sole defender of the free market in the
early 1990s (Pehe 1991). Moreover, as far as economic policies would find their way into campaign materials, they would primarily be calls for low- er taxes and less state regulation, the classic hobbyhorses of neoliberals.
However, particularly since the 1980s, several populist radical right parties have presented themselves in a completely different light. For example, in sharp contrast to its neoliberal populist predecessor, the FPd, the Danish DFP from the beginning “marketed itself as a welfare- friendly party that carried the legacy of the classical social democracy” (Bjørklund & Andersen 2002: 132). And most East European parties campaign strongly on social issues and around key concepts such as social justice; for example, the Bulgarian Ataka presents its preferred economic model as “social capitalism” (Ataka 2005).
Moreover, in sharp contrast to the common claim in the literature on political parties in general, and that on the populist radical right in particular, systematic content analyses of the socioeconomic program of populist radical right parties hardly ever support the predominance of neoliberalism (e.g. Mudde 2000a; Alaluf 1998; Govaert 1998; Roy 1998; Bastow 1997). Instead, these studies find a predominance of what could best be termed “nativist economics.” Scholars have further noted important changes in the economic programs and a rather peculiar com- bination of policies that support neither a purely liberal nor a purely socialist economic program (e.g. Betz 2003a; Eatwell 2003; Minkenberg 2000; Bastow 1997).
5.3.1 State and market
Like other political parties in contemporary Europe, virtually all populist radical right parties have accepted the fundamentals of capitalism and
the market economy. However, there is significant variation in the level of state involvement in the economy preferred by populist radical right parties. In fact, the party family spreads a significant part of the whole dimension between the two poles of laissez faire and state economy. Inter- estingly, this is also one of the few issues on which an East–West divide can still be noted, even if it is far from perfect.
The most pro-market member of the party family is the borderline case of the Swiss SVP, which began agrarian and developed through neocon- servative, into a populist radical right party (e.g. Skenderovic 2005). It is the only party to defend an unqualified “liberal economic order” (SVP 2003: 56). Its election manifesto reads as a strong defense of the free market: “The overburdening state interventionism in the end leads to the downfall of the Swiss economy” (SVP 2003: 56). According to the party, this is already happening in Switzerland and there is only one cure: less state, more market. “The economy goes badly today, because the state intervenes more and more, makes restrictions and redistributes money, instead of creating a favorable general framework for the businesses” (SVP 2003: 56).
The other major party that has traditionally been closest to laissez faire ̈
integrate a liberal and a nativist wing (e.g. Riedlsperger 1998; Luther
̈
1991). Like that of liberal parties, the FPO propaganda is full of references
to “freedom” and “liberty”: the books of (then party leader) Jo ̈rg Haider, for example, carry titles such as Liberated Future beyond Left and Right (1997) and The Freedom that I Mean (1993). However, the economic model that the party supports is not so much a “free” market economy, but rather a “fair” market economy (faire Marktwirtschaft). While the fair market economy is clearly seen as more market-oriented than the current economic model of Austria, which is allegedly perverted by clientelism and socialism, it is also explicitly posited against neoliberalism. As Haider explains:
A ‘fair market economy’ is the answer to the coldness of turbo-capitalism and creates partnership instead of force by chambers [Kammerzwang]. Competition does not have to mean that only the winner survives. Businesses that exploit their employees, tolerate inhuman working conditions and do not invest in continued education [Weiterbildung], have no future. (1997: 10–11)
As is clear from the German title of Haider’s 1997 book, which literally includes the title of Anthony Giddens’ book Beyond Left and Right,3 as
3 Giddens’bookisalsoincludedinthelistof“books,whichhaveinspiredme,”asisTony Blair’s book My Vision (Haider 1997: 248).
market economics is the Austrian FPO, which has always struggled to
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̈ well as from many interviews with the party leader, Haider and the FPO
were strongly influenced by the “Third Way” of New Labour (see also Thompson 2000). But despite the fact that Tony Blair’s party is a strong supporter of the market economy and of liberalizing measures like dereg-
̈ ulation and privatization, as to a lesser extent are Haider and the FPO,
the ideology of the “Third Way” is better described as social liberal than as neoliberal (e.g. Freeden 1999).
Traditionally, third-way ideologies have been associated with an eco- nomic program that rejects both the free market and the state economy. Instead, they entailed “a strong, organic, hierarchically organized cor- poratist state, with a leader at the top” (Bastow 1998: 57; also Spicker 2000). Particularly during the Cold War the “Third Way” was a neutral economic and political position, opposing both American liberalism and Soviet socialism. Both the third way label and its positions have been popular among many ideological groups, including extreme right circles such as national revolutionaries and solidarists (see Bastow 2002; Griffin 2000). However, some populist radical right parties have also flirted with it; the Belgian VB used to support a “solidaristic” model, the Greek Hel- lenism Party (KE) called for a democratic model where “the economy is in the hands of the demos, i.e. the people,” the Italian MS-FT presents itself as “the national-popular alternative to liberal-capitalism,” while the Polish LPR supports “national solidarism” (e.g. Kolovos 2003; Mudde 2000a).
If anything, the populist radical right’s view on the relationship between
4
̈ ́
model as social market economy (e.g. BZO, MIEP, REP, Slovak SNS).
Essentially, the social market economy supports the capitalist economy, but wants the state to moderate its inherent detrimental social effects. In direct violation of free marketism, this includes state dirigisme and protectionist measures.
̈
Haider’s newest project, the BZO, has among its key focal points the
guarantee of the social market economy. Despite the change in termi- ̈
̈
ferent from the FPO’s “fair market economy”: a combination of a basic
free market with low taxes and various protectionist measures for small businesses, shopkeepers, and farmers. Similarly, Le Pen has stated that the FN supports “Rhenish capitalism which tries to reconcile a certain
4 In fact, this is not unlike New Labour’s “Third Way,” as several scholars have argued (e.g. Huntington & Bale 2002; Spicker 2000).
market and state is closest to that of Christian democracy.
terms, it resembles the CDU/CSU model of the “soziale Marktwirtschaft” (social market economy) more than the “free market” of the liberal FDP. Several populist radical right parties also literally refer to their preferred
nology, however, the BZO’s “social market economy” is not much dif-
In German
level of economic performance with an acceptable level of social well- being” (in Simmons 2003: 31–2). Some parties even defend an essentially Keynesian economic model, arguing that “[t]he state should in times of recession execute extensive investments as well as lower taxes and duties” (DVU n.d.: point 5).
However, whereas the state involvement of Christian democrats is mainly informed by the Christian concept of charity (charitas), the pop- ulist radical right’s prime motivation is nativist. The economy should be at the service of the nation and only the nation. Or, in the words of the Greek Eoniko Komma (National Party, EK), “the national state has the duty to define the conditions of the economic procedures so that these activities benefit the whole of the people and the general interests of the country” (in Kolovos 2003: 50).
Consequently, the populist radical right holds a relatively positive view of the market within the nation-state, but it regards the European and global markets with great suspicion. In the words of the FN, “globaliza- tion leads to company relocations, thus to unemployment, and Maastricht brings about the deregulation of public services, thus insecurity” (in Bas- tow 1998: 60). This nativist suspicion also applies to the welfare state, which is supported in principle, but should be provided only to needy members of the nation.
Many parties call for the protection of the welfare state at its present or previous high levels, including the increase of some social benefits (notably pensions) and the introduction of new provisions (e.g. parental wage or Kindercheck). However, they also want to limit access to welfare provisions. Arguing that the welfare state has become a “hammock” rather than a “safety net,” they want to exclude the so-called Sozialschmarotzer, i.e. those who can work but prefer to “live off” the state, to reserve “social provisions for those who really need them” (CP 1980). However, this only applies to needy people from the own nation. To ensure the translation of this principle into policy, the parties call for a distinction within the welfare system between “natives” and “aliens” (see 5.3.4).
5.3.2 Protectionism
The centrality of nativism to populist radical right parties significantly impacts their economic programs. The national economy should be at the service of the natives; hence it should be under the strict control of the nation and the international free market should be approached with great suspicion. In fact, many parties are close to a model of national capitalism, in which the market is principally accepted but international free trade is largely rejected. The aversion to international interference extends to the EU as well, at least since the 1990s, when most populist
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radical right parties became increasingly EU-skeptic (see chapter 7). The late REP leader Scho ̈nhuber clearly linked the themes of external and internal protectionism in his critique of the then European Communities (EC): “who benefits from the EC? Primarily the Euromultinationals, big business, but not small-scale craftsmen, farmers or workers” (in Fieschi et al. 1996: 244).
Most Western European populist radical right parties try to find a bal-
ance between protection of the national economy and access to external
̈
markets. For example, the FPO argues, “[t]o counter the foreign sell-
off of Austria’s economy we have to give priority to building an effective Austrian capital market” (1997: 21); and consequently calls for some (relatively limited) protectionist measures. In the same vein the British BNP supports the “[p]rotection of British industry by the selective exclu- sion of foreign manufactured goods from the British market (BNP 1994: my italics), while the German DVU demands, “through subsidies the state should keep the coal-mine, shipbuilding and steel industry alive and competitive, as is also done abroad, as we should not become even more dependent on foreign interests” (Deutsche National-Zeitung 12/02/1988).
The preference for a national(ist) capitalist system is most strongly expressed by populist radical right parties in Eastern Europe. The Czech Republicans argued that “[i]t is not tolerable that landless liberalism based on the invisible hand of the market liquidates the fundamentals
ˇ
of the national economy” (SPR-RSC 1999). Similarly, the Slovak SNS
proclaimed in the introduction of its 1996–97 program:
The SNS prefers the concentration of capital, means of production and property to be in the hands of national subjects, which is the only guarantee of Slovakia’s economic power. The SNS does not support, and will never support, the sale of any wealth into the hands of anonymous, supra-national and cosmopolitan subjects who misuse their economic power for political influence. (in Fried 1997: 103)
This has inspired some parties to call for quite radical policies. The Bulgarian Ataka favors a policy of national preference with regard to the local business community: “Bulgarian businessmen need to have an advantage over foreigners; Bulgarian business, private or state, should always be helped by the state” (Ataka 2005). Istva ́n Csurka, the leader of
́
the Hungarian MIEP, goes a step further, expressing a drastic desire for
autarchy. As always led by his anti-Semitic worldview, he proclaims:
We need to adopt a self-defense policy. We need our own projects, own road constructions, own education, and own army. And for that we need money that is ours and does not come from loans . . . money that serves only Hungarian purposes and comes from Hungarian work. (in Mihancsik 2001: 160)
While the Eastern European parties are the most extreme in their demands to protect the nation against foreign economic dominance, all European populist radical right parties are characterized by an essen- tially nativist approach to economics. Some parties explicitly express this support; for example, the Slovak PSNS (n.d.) considers “economical nationalism” a cornerstone of its ideology, describing it as “the adver- tisement [promotion] of buying domestic products and the support of domestic production and agriculture.” Two sectors of the national econ- omy are singled out for national protection by all parties: small businesses and agriculture.
For the populist radical right, small businesses are “the backbone of our economy and ensure our stability” (SVP 2003: 36; also Haider 1997: 128). The key argument is that small businesses employ far more people than big multinationals do and they invest their profits in the national economy. Hence, virtually all parties call for state protection and both
ˇ
direct and indirect support for small businesses (e.g. SPR-RSC 1999;
CD 1989). Their advocacy of these policies is entirely logical given that for the populist radical right “small business growth is the key to success in the future” (SD 2005).
In the populist radical right view the agricultural sector is also deemed
vital to the survival of the nation. In the words of the German REP (n.d.),
“[a]griculture is an essential and elementary component of our national
economy. It should secure our nourishment and keep us from political
dependence and blackmail.” As a result, various parties demand that
the national agricultural sector become self-sufficient (e.g. BNP, FN,
̈
FPO, LPR). In the words of the Finnish Isa ̈nmaallinen Kansallis-Liitto
(Patriotic National Alliance, IKL), “the position of agriculture and food- stuff production have to be secured in such a way that self-sufficient food supplies can be guaranteed in all circumstances in the country” (IKL n.d.). The reason is given by the Polish LPR (2002): “A nation that fails to nourish itself will never be truly free (is destined to be enslaved).” The Italian MS-FT even launched a campaign under the motto: “Consume national products. Save your country. Eat Italian.”
While the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) could initially count upon some support within the party family, the continuing reforms have been a major reason for the growing populist radical right opposition against European integration (Bastow 1997). Some parties even demand
̈
the “re-nationalization of agricultural policy” (FPO 1997: 29). Opposi-
tion to the European agricultural program has been particularly strong in some of the new member states in the East, nowhere more so than in Poland. Although not the main defender of Polish farmers, given the competition from the PSL and Samoobrona, the LPR clearly addresses
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the CAP in its program: “We will protect the Polish market from unfair foreign concurrence” (LPR 2003: IV.10).
In Eastern Europe, the protection of the agricultural sector has an
additional sensitivity: privatization of land ownership. As land was state-
owned under communism, and tilled by state-owned and operated mass
farms (i.e. kolkhozes and sovkhozes), the transformation from state social-
ism to market capitalism involved the mass privatization of land. Most
populist radical right parties did not so much reject land privatization per
se, although they would criticize the (alleged) corruption involved; rather, ́
they rejected the sale of “native land” to foreigners. The Hungarian MIEP campaigned with the slogan “Hungarian land must be kept in Hungarian hands,” while the Bulgarian Ataka called the sale of land to foreigners “anti-Bulgarian” (Sofia News Agency 26/06/2005) and argues that “Bul- garian land should never ever be sold to foreigners” (Ataka 2005). The Polish LPR even submitted a “citizens’ motion” to the Sejm, calling for a referendum on the sale of land to foreigners. The party claimed the motion was supported by some 600,000 signatures (RFE/RL Newsline 16/10/2002).
5.3.3 Deregulation and privatization
Much of the work that defines the populist radical right as essentially
neoliberal refers to three key demands in the propaganda of some parties ̈
There are numerous examples of calls for deregulation in the literature of populist radical right parties. The SVP is probably the strongest and most consistent opponent of state intervention, fighting “the corset of state regulations and restrictions” and calling for “a minimum of state and a maximum of market” (SVP 2003: 9, 36). Other parties will differ not so much in the frequency of calls for deregulation, as in the consistency of their calls. While endlessly criticizing and ridiculing the red tape that stifles the national economy, particularly regarding European regulations, they also call for new strict regulation to protect the national economy against foreign competitors (see below). In short, the populist radical right might think that there are too many rules in certain areas; it also believes that there is too little regulation in others. This can hardly be seen as strong evidence for the existence of a (core) neoliberalist ideology.
(particularly the FPO and LN): lower taxes, deregulation, and privatiza- tion. The first is not particularly convincing as an indicator of a neolib- eral ideology, as the call for lower taxes is an almost universal political demand, especially among opposition parties. The latter two, support for deregulation and privatization, require some consideration.
Regarding privatization the situation is even less convincing. Calls for the privatization of companies or economic sectors are quite rare in the literature of populist radical right parties. In Western Europe this might be explained by the fact that few sectors are still in the hands of the state; this is particularly true for EU member states. When such demands are
̈
found in the party literature, such as the FPO call for “genuine priva-
tization” (1997: 21), the prime motivation seems to be political rather than economical (see below). Moreover, there are also parties rejecting “forced privatization” (CD 1998: III.1).
In contrast with true neoliberal ideology many populist radical right parties attach all sorts of limiting conditions to their calls for privatiza- tion. One could say that they support nativist privatization in which the privatized companies remain largely in the hands of the natives and “vital sectors” of the economy, i.e. those deemed essential to the survival of the nation-state, are excluded from (open) privatization; in the words of the Greek LAOS, “liberalism with state control on issues of national impor- tance” (in Kolovos 2003: 67). In some cases, parties will even call for a (re-)nationalization of companies within these strategic sectors.
ˇ
According to the Czech SPR-RSC (1999), 51 percent of all that is
privatized has to be in the hands of national capital, including every- thing related to the strategic industries (railways, mines, energy). Their demands are not much different from the French FN’s advocacy of a cap- italisme populaire (popular capitalism) in which 70 percent of the shares of public enterprises to be privatized will be in the hands of French families. The party further wants the state “to maintain the big services which are essential for the functioning of the nation, for its security, under the con- trol of the public powers, that is to say, energy production, public trans- port, communications and telecommunications and the arms sector” (in Bastow 1998: 65). The list of the Polish LPR is even more exhaustive (e.g. LPR 2003: IV.4).
On average, Eastern European populist radical right parties are more antiliberal and protectionist than their brethren in the West. Because of the legacy of state socialism, postcommunist Europe has seen an unprece- dented level of privatization, in terms of both scope and speed. This pro- cess was strongly linked to corruption and patronage, both in fact and in the perception of the population (e.g. Karklins 2005; Holmes 1997). Moreover, in many cases the privatization led to major companies being sold off to foreign companies, including some from traditional “enemies” (such as Germany, Russia, and the United States).
Seen in this context, it is not surprising that the Eastern European parties have been more skeptical about privatization. As one author per- ceptively summarized this position, the populist radical right has “tended
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to support a gradual transition to a market economy with significant state intervention in the economy in the foreseeable future” (Irvine 1995: 148). This state intervention should not just protect certain key sectors of the economy, but also weak groups within the nation. As LDPR leader Zhiri- novsky once expressed it,
I am in favor of a diversified economy, in favor of market relations. But a market economy is not for every body. Pensioners, invalids, mothers with large families, children and youth are not adapting to it. They need social defense, and the president must defend them. (Williams & Hanson 1999: 270)
Postcommunist populist radical right parties are highly critical of the way
liberal economics has been introduced in the transition period; the so-
called “shock therapy,” which they believe has had severe material and
nonmaterial detrimental effects upon the nation. According to the Czech
Republicans, “[t]here hasn’t been any privatization. Everyone under-
stands that it was nothing less than a simple robbery of the state prop-
ˇ
erty” (SPR-RSC 1999). In line with this assessment, the Slovak PSNS
has opposed “the sellout of the national economy” (RFE/RL Newsline 09/10/2001), while the Croatian HSP-1861 has called for the introduc- tion of a Law of Denationalization (HSP-1861 1997b). In the post-Soviet space the parties tend to be even more radical antiliberal, at times border- ing on anticapitalism. Even the seriously misnamed Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, which tries to present a more Western image (at times), denounces the introduction of the market economy by previous Rus- sian governments as “the criminal experiments of the radical democrats” (LDPR 1995).
5.3.4 Welfare chauvinism
Most populist radical right parties would agree with Haider’s short and simple description of the socioeconomic policy of his Freiheitlichen: “social, not socialist” (1997: 226). In a Europe where extended welfare states are the norm, both in the East and in the West, no political party dares to propose the full dismantling of the welfare state. At the same time, most parties, including those on the center-left, argue that the sys- tem has become too elaborate and expensive to maintain and that at least some cuts will have to be made to keep it affordable. Within the pop- ulist radical right the extent of cut-backs advocated by particular parties varies substantially, in part relative to the extent of the existing welfare provisions in the country.
Some parties are much closer to the Christian democratic and con- servative position on welfare than to the socialist and social democratic
position. The former is based on the importance of charity, implying a privilege extended by the state and society, while the latter proceeds from the idea of solidarity, meaning an obligation to be met. This is particu-
̈
larly the case with Western European parties like the Austrian FPO and
the Italian LN, both of which inspired Betz’s ideal type, “neoliberal pop- ulism” (Betz 1994). Haider used to argue that social policy (Sozialpoli- tik) is not necessarily a competency of the state and that “help to self- help in the private sector can be more effective, economic and social” (1997: 226–7). Similarly, in Switzerland the SVP calls for more “indi- vidual responsibility” with regard to “social insurances” (2003: 9), while the Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz (Freedom Party of Switzerland, FPS) argues that “[m]arket economical foundations – in particular stimuli to an open competition – have their worth for the insured, the insurants, and the medical professionals” (1999: 4.2.4).
Other populist radical right parties find the concept of solidarity far less problematic, and present themselves explicitly as “social” parties. The FN distributes pamphlets and posters with the slogan “Le social, c’est le Front National” (The social, that’s the National Front). The Slovak SNS summarizes its party program in three principles, of which “the social principle” is one; the “national principle” and the “Christian” principle” are the other two (SNS n.d.). Furthermore, its party program states that “the SNS promotes economic and social ethics based on solidarity” (SNS 2002: 20). There are even parties that want the state to guarantee full employment (e.g. DN, FN, HSP-1861), a demand normally only found among socialist (not even social democratic) parties.
Some authors have accused the populist radical right of “social dem- agogy” (e.g. Ptak 1999) and “social paranoia” (Rensmann 2003: 116). While this may be an overstatement and definitely reflects a normative bias, many of the parties do campaign with slogans that clearly express an “economic populist” program reminiscent of Latin American populists (e.g. Mudde 2001; Weyland 1999). The Croatian HSP-1861 contested the 1997 local elections with the message “Work for Unemployed – Jus- tice for All – Food for the Hungry” (HSP-1861 1997b). And PRM leader Tudor used the slogan “Food, heating, medicine, law!” to call upon the Romanians to “vote for the tribune” in the 2004 presidential elections.
However, the solidarity of the populist radical right has very clear boundaries. First of all, it does not include so-called Sozialschmarotzer, i.e. all those who can work but prefer social benefits, even if they are “native.” “The system of the social welfare state can only be preserved
̈ if the allocation of benefits goes primarily to those in social need” (FPO
1997: 24). Second, and more important, the benefits of the welfare state should be limited to the “own people.”
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In this nativist interpretation of the welfare state, fairly generous social benefits are to be guaranteed for the native needy (mainly pensioners and the sick), while “aliens” are to be excluded. This is not just argued on the basis of nativist arguments, but also on “common sense” financial grounds. The argumentation is that the welfare state can only be sustained at the required level when it is limited to the “own people.” Or, in the words of a 1980s pamphlet of the German REP: “Saving the social state: expelling sham refugees (Asylbetru ̈ger)! Solving unemployment: stopping immigration!”
This welfare chauvinist model has been most elaborated by the FN and the VB, the latter often imitating its French sister party. In the infamous seventy-point program, an expansion of the fifty-point program of the FN (1991), the VB presents a highly detailed “apartheid regime” with respect to, among others, the welfare state. For example, the party wants “national preference” with respect to general social services, jobs, and social housing (Dewinter 1992: 11–12; also FN 1991: E). Moreover, as part of its “deterrent politics,” the VB wants to limit child and unem- ployment benefits as well as property rights for “non-European aliens” (Dewinter 1992: 27–8).
A similar but far less elaborate approach is suggested by some East- ern European parties that want to redesign their social benefits pro- grams to exclude ethnic minorities, most notably the Roma. For exam- ple, in its proposal to abolish income tax for families with five children or more, the Czech Republika ́ni Miroslava Sla ́dka (Republicans of Miroslav Sla ́dek, RMS) excludes “those groups of the population which use child allowances as the source of their living and bring disadvantages to citi- zens of high integrity and those people who are economically active,” a reference to Roma obvious to any Czech citizen (in Report 2002: 27).
In conclusion, the populist radical right supports an ambiguous eco- nomic program that entails a “mixture of market liberalism and welfare chauvinism” (Betz 1994: 174). However, most importantly, they sup- port a nativist economic model, i.e. an economy that (solely) benefits the “natives” and that is protected against “alien” influences.
5.4 Economics: secondary and instrumental
The idea that neoliberalism predominates within the economic program of populist radical right parties is not the only misperception within the literature. Equally erroneous is the contention that economics is primary to the ideology and success of this party family. In fact, as careful analysis of the programs and surveys of the electorates of these parties makes clear, socioeconomic issues are secondary to the populist radical right party family. Their socioeconomic principles proceed from the core tenets of their ideology (i.e. nativism, authoritarianism, and populism) rather than determine them, and can be and are consequently instrumentalized to attack competitors and attract voters.
5.4.1 The party perspective
At first sight, the secondary nature of the socioeconomic agenda can already be observed from the relatively little attention it receives in the programs and propaganda of populist radical right parties (cf. Mudde 2000a; Roy 1998; Spruyt 1995). Some leading members in more suc- cessful parties started to recognize this in the 1990s. Bruno Me ́gret, then still the number two of the FN, said in 1996: “Today we are recognized as competent in the area of insecurity or immigration: tomorrow we must conquer a third important domain, the economic and social” (in Bas- tow 1998: 63). Similarly, Gerolf Annemans was the driving force behind the elaboration of the socioeconomic program of the VB, which was developed at the thematic conferences “Vlaanderen werkt!” (Flanders works!) in November 1996 (VB 1996) and “Ondernemend Vlaanderen” (Entrepreneurial Flanders) in November 2005 (VB 2005a).
While members of the party family differ somewhat with respect to the content of their socioeconomic program, they are in full agreement regarding its importance within their broader ideology and program: (socio)economics is a secondary issue (Betz 2003b; Mudde 1999). The Schweizer Demokraten (Swiss Democrats) have expressed this general standpoint clearly in their election program: “the economy is not an end in itself, but rather serves the true needs of the people of Switzerland” (in Olson 2000: 32). Similarly, the Greek EK states that “the economy is not the end-goal but the means” (in Kolovos 2003: 50).
Populist radical right parties define their (socio)economic policy on the basis of their core ideology, particularly nativism, and instrumentalize it accordingly. Even in the case of those parties that have more sophisticated economic programs, and which come closer to the neoliberal stereotype, the economy remains a secondary, highly instrumentalized issue. In the words of Michael Minkenberg, “market liberalism was never a key com- ponent of right-wing ideology . . . it was a tactical tool to be abandoned as soon as the political winds changed and protectionism and welfare chauvinism seemed more promising” (2000: 173–4).
For example, whereas the early programs of the Italian LN included various neoliberal demands, particularly in the 1990s, they first and fore- most served the higher goal of the party, nativism (sometimes in the shape of regionalism). Consequently, if nativist and neoliberal goals clashed,
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such as over the issue of immigration, the LN always chose the former (cf. Cento Bull & Gilbert 2001). In the same way, “the use and distribu- tion of economic resources was claimed not on the grounds of a neoliberal agenda of more or less state, but as a matter of political rights questioning the whole edifice of the Italian state” (Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002: 99). Similar arguments and strategies can be found among many populist radical right parties, hiding nativist demands under a neoliberal veneer.
̈
In the case of the FPO, one of the few parties that remained somewhat
loyal to its neoliberal rhetoric of the 1990s despite the proletarization of
its electorate, many calls for privatization and other alleged neoliberal
measures clearly have another, more important motivation. At least until
the late 1980s, the Austrian political system, known as Proporzdemokratie
(proportional democracy), meant that virtually all aspects of life were
dominated (and distributed) by the two parties, including the economy.
And through their grip on the economy, which in reality was not as big
̈
as the FPO made it out to be, the two parties had disposal over a huge
system of patronage, which gave them an important electoral and political
̈
advantage over the FPO. Proposals for revision of the economic system
therefore were to a large extent attempts to weaken the party’s main
̈ ̈ political competitors, i.e. the two established parties (SPO and OVP),
and to create a level playing field in the electoral and political arenas (e.g. Betz 2003b; Heinisch 2003).
̈
The purely instrumental nature of the FPO’s interest in the economy
is clear from many of Haider’s statements, including the following: “We
want to see real competition between the public and the private sectors
instead of a monopoly of politicized housing cooperatives which hand
out apartments. This whole party book system must be a thing of the
past” (in Tiersky 2001: 233). Likewise, the party manifestos make various
references to this issue: “Through a program of genuine privatization, the
withdrawal of political parties and associations from the economy, the
reduction of influence of interest groups and their restriction to their real
tasks, the power of party functionaries in the public economy should be
̈
eliminated” (FPO 1997: 21; also 14).
While “overpromising” (Papadopoulos 2000) is common to all political parties, at least during election time, opposition parties tend to have an advantage over those in government, as they have no track record against which to judge the likelihood of their delivering on their commitments. As most members of the European populist radical right party family are (semi-)permanent opposition parties, they are unconstrained by politi- cal inhibitions in pursuing their vote-maximizing strategy to the fullest (Deschouwer 2001). Consequently, they can get away with highly con-
ˇ
tradictory points in their programs. The Czech SPR-RSC was one of the few Eastern European populist radical right parties to be confronted by a cordon sanitaire, although an unofficial one, and provides a good example of this opportunistic use of its socioeconomic program. In the words of one scholar:
The main contradiction of all its election manifestos was the call for a drastic decrease of taxes and a reduction of the state apparatus, on the one hand, and the call to generously support practically all weaker social groups, on the other: pensioners, young families, women with small children, state care for socially weak citizens, building of social housing, subsidies for agriculture, railways, sports, free education at all levels, financial support for inhabitants of economically impaired regions, etc. (Havelkova ́ 2002: 240–1)
5.4.2 The voter perspective
An indirect way of determining whether socioeconomic issues are primary or secondary to the electorates of populist radical right parties is to look at their class base. If the electorate of a party has a highly homogeneous class base, it is concluded that economics does play an important role to its voters. In contrast, if the electorate is cross-class, particularly including groups with opposing economic interests (objectively defined), it is taken for granted that economics is largely a secondary issue. Indeed, various studies have shown that these parties do have cross-class electorates, com- bining an overrepresentation of two opposing groups: the self-employed and blue-collar workers (e.g. Evans 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005).
However, an alternative explanation is also possible. As populist radi- cal right parties present a schizophrenic socioeconomic agenda, i.e. using both neoliberal and welfare chauvinist rhetoric, both groups might actu- ally (think they) vote for the right party on the basis of their preferred economic position. And as long as these parties remain in (total) oppo- sition, they will not have to choose between differing positions and can continue to promise the world to all groups.
Not much is known about the socioeconomic attitudes of the elec- torates of the populist radical right. Usually, these are measured by socio- economic position (class) or occupation, assuming that (all) individuals with a certain position or occupation hold the same socioeconomic views (e.g. Kitschelt & McGann 1995). Studies of the electorates of various populist radical right parties show that their voters do not stand out from those of other right-wing parties in terms of their socioeconomic views; in fact, they are slightly less neoliberal (e.g. Mayer 2005; Ivarsflaten 2002). Pippa Norris comes to a fairly similar conclusion in her comparative study, although she qualifies her inference, noting that “the full range of
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economic attitudes toward the role of markets and the state were only poorly gauged” in the particular survey she used (2005: 260).
Interestingly, Flemish research finds that rather than neoliberal or socialist, most voters of the VB hold socioeconomic views that are best labeled “economic populist” or “right-wing egalitarian” (Derks 2005:
̈
21). Similarly, the FPO electorate has a lower percentage of “social state
traditionalists” and “market liberal individualists” than the Austrian elec- torate as a whole, yet a higher proportion of “welfare state chauvinists” (Plasser & Ulram n.d.: 5). This indicates that the views of the electorate and the parties of the populist radical right are in fact not as different as is often claimed.
The only way to clearly establish whether economics is secondary to the electorate of the populist radical right is by probing into voter moti- vations. Unfortunately, very few studies use these questions to test their hypotheses. Some studies of political priorities among voting groups do indicate that socioeconomic concerns are secondary to the electorates of the populist radical right. For example, in 1992 securing social security
̈
and pensions had a high priority for only 36 percent of FPO voters, which
was below the Austrian average (42 percent) and only the fifth most- mentioned priority (even after “improve environmental protection”; Betz 1994: 66). In the 2002 presidential elections in France, “unemployment” ranked a shared third in the list of major concerns of Le Pen voters and fourth for Me ́gret voters (Perrineau 2002: 9).
The few studies that do ask for the motivations of voters provide strong evidence that only a tiny minority of the electorate of (Western) Euro- pean populist radical right parties select their party primarily on the basis of economic self-interest (e.g. Swyngedouw 2001; Fetzer 2000). They also clearly show that, in contrast to the electorates of most mainstream parties, socioeconomic issues are only secondary to the voters of populist radical right parties (e.g. Mayer 2005). Similar results have been found in countries outside of Europe, such as Australia (e.g. Goot & Watson 2001) and the United States (Weakliem 2001).
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter challenges one of the most widespread and fervent misper- ceptions in the field, i.e. the importance of neoliberal economics to the ideological program and electoral success of the populist radical right party family. Comparative study of the party literature of the European populist radical right family shows that (1) their economic program is not neoliberal and (2) economics is not a primary issue to the party family. In fact, the bulk of the parties hold a fairly centrist position on the dominant state–market axis, relatively similar to that of the Christian democratic family. However, most importantly, for the populist radical right the economy should always be at the service of the nation. They defend a nativist economic program based upon economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism.
As economics is a secondary issue to the populist radical right party family, the parties instrumentalize it to pursue their primary ideological agenda, i.e. nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Liberal arguments are used to weaken the power of mainstream parties (e.g. privatization of party-controlled state institutions), while social measures are supported to protect or strengthen the nation (e.g. agricultural and family subsidies). Additionally, as most populist radical right parties are vote-maximizing parties in semi-permanent opposition, they “overpromise” to attract as wide a support basis as possible: e.g. tax cuts for the companies and middle class and increased social benefits for the (native) socially weak.
While many commentators have considered this to be the Achilles heel of the populist radical right, some empirical research suggests that this schizophrenic presentation of their socioeconomic agenda pays off (at least in the short run). By presenting neoliberal and welfare chauvinist policies and rhetoric, populist radical right parties are able to attract dif- ferent groups of voters with distinct economic preferences (e.g. Immer- fall 1998). It might be true that this could potentially be a problem when they implement their policies in government (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2005), but in most cases this is merely a theoretical problem, as the parties are far removed from actual political power. Until that moment, the populist rad- ical right has much to gain by keeping economics a secondary issue that is first and foremost of strategic value in their larger ideological struggle.
