3 Who’s afraid of . . . ?
The Other lies at the heart of radical right politics, and for the radical right, which understands the world in terms of struggle, in terms of “us” versus “them,” the Other is translated into “the Enemy.”
(Ramet 1999b: 4)
3.1 Introduction
Identity politics, of which the populist radical right is (just) one form, is always based upon an “us–them” distinction. To construct the native identity, one needs to delineate the boundaries with other identities, i.e. those of the nonnatives. In other words, to construct the ingroup (“us”) one needs to construct the outgoup(s) (“them”). This process of ingroup–outgroup differentiation, which social psychologists and others have described as standard behavior in identity building (e.g. Brewer 1999; Tajfel 1982), has been said to be even more crucial to the populist radical right than to other actors engaged in identity politics (e.g. Geden 2005; Pelinka 2005).
Within the literature, various scholars have pointed out the dissimi- larities between the ways the populist radical right differentiates between ingroup and outgroup(s) and the process of identity construction among, for example, Greens or gay and lesbian activists. First, populist radi- cal rightists are believed to hold a Manichaean worldview: the world is divided into “good” and “bad” (e.g. Eatwell 2000; Ramet 1999b). Indeed, one of the key characteristics of populism is the dominance of morality (e.g. Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000). Consequently, the “us–them” division is transformed into a Schmittian friend–foe distinction in which the “Other” is demonized (e.g. Abts & Rummens 2005; Mouffe 1995; Gessenharter 1991).
Second, the populist radical right is said to define the ingroup mainly through the description of outgroups (e.g. Taggart 2002). In other words, whereas the defining features of the ingroup identity remain vague or
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unspecified, those of the “anti-figure” (Cohn 1971: xix) are described very clearly and explicitly. Hence, the ingroup is largely defined ex neg- ativo, i.e. as the mirror image of the outgroups and their alleged char- acteristics. Consequently, a better understanding of the outgroups, or in the populist radical right’s thinking the “enemies,” is crucial to getting a better understanding of the worldview of the populist radical right.
In a comparative study of this scope it is hard to come up with a struc- ture that allows for a coherent yet comprehensive presentation of the enemies of the populist radical right that goes beyond an endless list of the multitude of groups feared and hated by the various parties within this family in contemporary Europe. With some exceptions, most studies focus on only one group of enemies of the contemporary populist radical right party family, recent (non-European) immigrants. As far as other enemies are mentioned, they tend to be rather idiosyncratic, i.e. particu- lar to that specific populist radical right party, for example Serbs for the HSP or Walloons for the VB.
As “every country has its own favorite enemy” (Von Beyme 1996: 438), each populist radical right party also sports its own particular list of ene- mies, largely dependent upon its national context and ideological partic- ularities. In order to move beyond the idiosyncrasies of individual parties to establish a more general understanding of the prime characteristics and key role of enemies in the politics of the populist radical right, the chapter is structured in accordance with a typology of enemies applicable to the whole populist radical right party family. Within these categories, parties might include different groups of enemies. The next section presents this broad typology of enemies and presents examples and general character- istics of the four different types. The final section discusses three special groups of enemies and prejudices: Jews and anti-Semitism, Muslims and Islamophobia, and Roma (and Sinti) and Romophobia. Finally, in the conclusion, the description of the various groups and types of enemies is related to the self-definition of the ingroup, i.e. the “native.”
3.2 A typology of enemies
For the populist radical right two categories are particularly important in terms of identity and politics: the nation and the state. These two define to a large extent who is and who is not “native.” It thus makes sense to base a broad typology of enemies on membership in these two categories. This two-by-two table produces four types of enemies: (1) those within both the nation and the state; (2) those outside of the nation but within the state; (3) those within the nation but outside the state; and (4) those outside both the nation and the state (see table 3.1). Within
Who’s afraid of . . . ?
Table 3.1 Typology of enemies
State Within Within (1)
Outside (3)
65
Nation
Outside
(2) (4)
each category, different groups of enemies are identified and feared on the basis of a few basic arguments and characteristics. The main aim of the following discussion is to describe these more general subgroups, rather than to lose ourselves in the details of the almost limitless singular enemies and arguments identified by the individual populist radical right parties.
Before we do this, however, it is important to emphasize that outgroups, like ingoups, are social constructs; in the famed terminology of Benedict Anderson (1983), they are “imagined.” While the various enemies might refer to real existing groups, such as Muslims in Denmark or Hungarian- speakers in Romania, the characteristics of the groups will be stereotyp- ical constructs. Consequently, some individuals who meet the objective criteria of an outgroup might be excluded from the category “enemy”
1
3.2.1 Within the state, within the nation
The definition of enemies in this first category is based mainly on two of the three features of the populist radical right core ideology: nativism and populism. The key internal enemy of all populist radical right parties is “the elite,” a broad and indeterminate amalgam of political, economic, and cultural actors. The national elite is criticized in both nativist and populist terms, i.e. as traitors to the nation and as corruptors of the people. In much of the propaganda of the parties, these two features are combined. For example, the Bulgarian Partija Ataka (Party Attack,
1 Almost everyone who has had a conversation with people who openly espouse anti- immigrant sentiments will have noticed these inconsistencies. For example, someone will argue that all Turks have to leave the country because they are too lazy to work, but will exclude his colleague Ali. When confronted with the question why Ali, who is clearly (and objectively) Turkish, does not have to leave the country, he will argue that Ali is not a real Turk, as he is not lazy and he works.
on the basis of subjective criteria.
leaders and heroes of strictly defined ingroups did not themselves meet the criteria of that ingroup (e.g. Hitler or Stalin).
This also applies to ingroups: various
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Ataka) reduces the current situation in the country to a struggle between “national traitors” and “honorable Bulgarian patriots” (Segert 2005b), while the Romanian PRM uses the slogan “Sus Patria! Moarte Mafei!” (Up with the homeland! Down with the Mafia!), insinuating that the (other) politicians are both corrupt and antinational. In similar vein, Robert Kilroy-Silk launched his new Veritas party stating: “Our country is being stolen from us and we have never been asked for our permis- sion . . . Elect me and a few more like me and I promise they will not get away with the lies again in the future” (Yorkshire Post 03/02/2005).
Various populist radical right parties make little distinction between the political and the economic elite, or in the unique language of the Ukrainian extreme right UNA-UNSO, the “bitch collaborators and goat democrats” (in Dymerskaya-Tsigelman & Finberg 1999: 5). The Russian LDPR describes the established politicians, referred to as “democrats” in quotation marks or “radical democrats” without quotation marks, as agents of the West who reap huge financial gains from selling out the natural riches of the country and who break the spirit of the nation by denouncing honest patriotism with accusations of fascism and imperi- alism (LDPR 1995). The latter argumentation is very similar to the attacks of German and Hungarian populist radical rightists on their elites, whom they accuse of using “re-education” (Umerziehung) to make Germans/Hungarians passive and self-hating (e.g. Bock 2002; Mudde 2000a; Gessenharter 1991).
In another theme of treachery, a broad coalition of elites is linked to the issue of immigration. Western European populist radical right par- ties are vehemently xenophobic towards (non-European) immigrants, but often consider the national elites as the true culprits of mass immigra- tion. They see mass immigration as a conspiracy of the left-wing parties, trade unions, and big business in which the first two want to (artifi- cially) increase their support base, and the latter their pool of cheap labor (e.g. Zaslove 2004a; Mudde 2000a). Hence, they came together to push through their egocentric agendas at the expense of the nation (and the “little man”). Similarly, Eastern European parties claim that their elites are discriminating against the “native” or “own” population in favor of “minorities” like the “Gypsies” and “Turks.”
Virtually all populist radical right parties accuse the national elite of being “left-wing” and “progressive.” In Western Europe they link these ideas back to the “new left” and the student revolts of May 1968: for example, Italian LN leader Umberto Bossi often refers to “those ’68 fools” (see Zaslove 2004a: 107). In Eastern Europe the point of historical reference is the former communist regime: the new elites are accused of being “the old elites with new masks” (Tismaneanu 1996: 527). This is
Who’s afraid of . . . ? 67
most strongly expressed in the theme of the “stolen revolution,” oddly enough expressed often by populist radical right leaders who used to work for the security services of that former regime and who played no (supportive) role in that “revolution” (see Mudde 2001).
Some populist radical right parties also see the cultural elite as part of
̈ the internal enemy. This has been particularly strong within the FPO,
which has been in a constant fight with part of the cultural elite, which reached new “heights” after the party joined the Austrian government in 2000. In its propaganda the party speaks of “cultural anarchists,” “cul- ture Mafiosi” and “social parasites” (e.g. Ahlemeyer 2006). The Roma- nian PRM even went as far as to publish “a list of top intellectuals who should be shot for the greater good of the country” (Pop Elechus 2001: 163).
Many populist radical right parties consider the media to be instru-
ments of the established parties, most notably in the struggle against
“the only real opposition” (e.g. FN, VB) or “the patriotic forces” (e.g.
ˇ
LDPR, SPR-RSC). Particularly when in power, the populist radical right
will denounce critique from the media as “traitorous” and “unpatriotic” (e.g. Heinisch 2003; Irvine 1997). Although many media do indeed openly campaign against the populist radical right, journalists will not so much follow a party line, but rather a company line or their own personal opinion. Most parties regard the media as part of one big con- spiracy, in which the media is under “left-wing control” (SVP 2003: 40), and journalists are leftists, liars, and traitors: “The monopolistic media hide the true values for the people” (Csurka 1997: 260). In the case of anti-Semitic populist radical right parties, obviously, the media are con- trolled by “the International Jewry.” In this regard, a popular word play within anti-Semitic circles is reference to the “Jew York Times,” build- ing upon the widespread linkage of New York (and the US) with Jewish domination.
In addition to the “traitors” and “corrupt(ers),” we can distinguish two more categories within the subtype of internal enemies: perverts and perverters. Perverts are people who deviate in actions or ideas from the populist radical right moral standard. Among this type of enemy one can find “sexual deviants” (e.g. homosexuals), junkies, and so-called Sozialschmarotzer, i.e. people who are perceived to draw social benefits without a valid reason. Importantly, the latter category does not include all people on welfare, but only those that according to the populist radical right do not need it (see also chapter 5).
Homophobia is part of many, but by no means all populist radical right parties. For example, the two Dutch parties of the 1990s, the CD and CP’86, did not take an overtly homophobic position (e.g. Mudde
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2
2000a). However, for most populist radical right parties in Catholic
and Orthodox countries, homosexuals are part of the perverted inter- nal enemy. In addition to being “a biological and social abnormality” (Le Pen), homosexuality is seen as a threat to the survival of the nation. Moreover, many parties will conflate homosexuals and pedophiles in their propaganda, making the perverted into the perverters. For example, the 1984 FN Program mentioned homosexuality only once, in the case of homosexual relationships between adults and minors. This was done under the heading of “Security” and used also to denounce the alleged laxity of the judiciary (see Lesselier 1988).
Perverters are even worse than the mere perverts, as they corrupt the pure and innocent and therefore further weaken the nation. Examples of perverters abound within the literature of the populist radical right. One group that is often singled out is the feminists, who allegedly try to pervert innocent women with their “unnatural” ideas of gender equality (see also 4.2). Another prime target is drug dealers – where the par- ties do not distinguish between “hard” (e.g. cocaine and heroine) and “soft drugs” (e.g. hashish and marihuana), but always exclude alcohol and cigarettes. Here it is often the youth wings of the parties that orga- nize the most vigilant campaigns, calling for higher penalties for drug dealers.
In various Eastern European countries “pro-Western” individuals are seen as perverters. The arguments are either that they support “West- ern values” (ranging from materialism to human rights), leading to the degeneration of the nation, or that “the West” is an enemy of the home- land, which makes the pro-Westerners traitors to their own country. The latter argument is particularly strong within the Russian LDPR and
́
the Serbian SRS, but can also been found in the Hungarian MIEP and
the Slovak SNS.
However, the internal enemy that is singled out for the most vehement
attacks is the populist radical right competitor. Much of the party litera- ture is filled with accusations of betrayal and corruption by people within the broader movement. This is particularly the case in countries where different populist radical right parties compete for a relatively limited
2 Even within the extreme right, homosexuality has not been rejected universally. His- toric examples include the (alleged) homosexuality of the top of the Nazi-German Sturmabteilung (Storm Division, SA), most notably its leader Ernst Ro ̈hm, while the issue has divided the British NF and the German neo-Nazi scene. Interestingly, Ger- many’s most charismatic and influential postwar neo-Nazi, Michael Ku ̈hnen, was an open homosexual who died of AIDS. He distributed a remarkable pamphlet arguing that it was in accordance with natural law that leaders should be homosexual, so as not to be diverted by women, while the masses should be heterosexual, to ensure the survival of the nation/race (Ku ̈hnen n.d.).
Who’s afraid of . . . ? 69
share of the electorate, such as in Germany and the Netherlands, or where larger parties have lost electoral significance because of party splits, as in France and Slovakia. For example, the German REP often referred to the DVU as a Spalter-Liste (splitter list), accusing it of being an instru- ment of the established parties – notably the Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union, CDU) – to divide the “real patri- ots” (Mudde 2000a: 54). And during the short existence of the Slovak Prava Slovenska ́ na ́rodna ́ strana (Real Slovak National Party, PSNS), leader Slota referred to his successor in the SNS, Anna Malikova ́, who had thrown him out of “his” party, as “my biggest mistake” and “a mad cow” (The Slovak Spectator 01–07/10/2001).
But the category of (populist) radical right enemies includes even peo- ple that are or were among the party faithful. First, there is “the apostate,” i.e. someone who was a committed member of the party but renounces both the cause and the party. This is the ultimate traitor, as she or he has seen the light, yet turned away from it. Second is “the infiltrator,” a person who is only in the party in the service of an external enemy (e.g. the secret service or antifascists). Generally, the smaller and more radical the group, the more paranoid it is. The “outing” of infiltrators is a popular activity that often approaches the absurd. For example, Viorel Salagean, a Sen- ator of the Romanian Partidul pentru Uniunea Nat ̧ionalna ̆ a Romaˆnilor (Party of Romanian National Unity, PUNR), accused party leader Funar of being a spy for the Hungarian minority (Gallagher 1997).
3.2.2 Within the state, outside the nation
The classic enemy within this category is the ethnic minority. Generally speaking, in Western Europe the archetypical group of the enemy within the state, outside the nation, is the immigrant community, whereas in Eastern Europe more or less indigenous ethnic minorities are the usual suspects. That said, various West European populist radical right parties are also xenophobic towards nonimmigrant ethnic minorities, while an increasing number of Eastern European parties have started to target the still small recent immigrant communities. For example, one of the leaders
́
of the Hungarian MIEP referred to “Galician newcomers” (referring to
both Ukrainians and Jews) as the source of all problems in Hungary (see Peto ̋ 2005).
Most of the literature focuses almost exclusively on non-European immigrants when addressing the xenophobia of populist radical right par- ties. Some authors have even adopted the term “antiimmigrant party” to label the parties, suggesting that their agendas are reducible to this sin- gle issue (e.g. Gibson 2002; Fennema 1997). There is no doubt that
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non-European immigrants are among the main enemies of these parties in Western Europe, particularly in their electoral propaganda. However, this is a relatively recent development, as various parties initially tar- geted European immigrants and have started to focus primarily on non- Europeans only since the mid to late 1980s. Their antipathy followed the immigration current in much of Western Europe, which changed from guest workers from among mainly South Europeans in the period 1950– 70 to mainly North Africans and Turks since the 1970s, with a sharp increase in non-European asylum seekers since the 1980s.
Among the recent groups of asylum seekers and immigrants, Mus- lims have been targeted most consistently and vehemently in the propa- ganda of populist radical right parties (see 3.3.2). However, non-Muslim immigrants have also been victims of xenophobic campaigns, including both Europeans and non-Europeans. Whereas the latter group was always treated with suspicion and fear, the position towards the former group, mostly immigrants and asylum seekers from Eastern Europe, has changed fundamentally. During the Cold War, populist radical right parties were vehemently anticommunist, making them fairly welcoming towards asy- lum seekers from Eastern Europe. In the words of the Belgian VB, they were “driftwood of collapsing political systems, of which they bear no guilt” (Vlaams Blok 5/91). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, they are no longer useful pawns in anticommunist propaganda, and have “thus” become targets of the usual xenophobic accusations (e.g. stealing jobs, being involved in crime).
In addition to the nativist arguments against immigrants in general, two seemingly “objective” arguments are used against the acceptance of asylum seekers and refugees: (1) they are not real political refugees, but “bogus” economic immigrants; and (2) there is no place for them. This is vividly captured in a pamphlet of the German REP, depicting a boat crowded with foreigners and reading “The boat is full. Stop the asylum sham.”
In postcommunist Eastern Europe itself, immigrants and refugees have
yet to be overtly politicized, with the notable exceptions of Slovenia in
ˇ
the early 1990s (e.g. Jalusˇicˇ 2002; Kuzmanizˇ 1999; Zagar 2002). Indeed,
some empirical studies show that immigrants and refugees are not (yet) perceived as a threat in Eastern Europe. According to data from the New Democracies Barometer, classic nativist feelings even decreased in most countries in the 1990s (e.g. Haerpfer 2002: 102). However, other studies show a growing disquiet about immigrants and refugees in various postcommunist countries, despite the fact that these countries still have very small (if growing) numbers of both groups (e.g. Coenders et al. 2004). Notwithstanding the existing anti-immigrant potential within these societies, Eastern European populist radical right parties give a rather low priority to anti-immigrant positions in their propaganda (Mudde 2005b). While the Czech Republicans included a section on immigration in their program, in it the party merely wrote:
Who can still believe today that our country can remain true to herself, when you
see that today it is an open paradise for various ethnic groups and our children
ˇ are gradually raised to the sounds of primitive black and Gypsy songs. (SPR-RSC
1999)
In Russia a single-issue party Rossijskoe Dvizhenie Protiv Nelegalnoj Immigratsii (Russian Movement against Illegal Immigration, DPNI) was founded in 2002. In its manifesto “How many Russians are there left in Moscow?,” which reads like a copy of anti-immigrant positions from the West European populist radical right, the group links immigrants to all evils of society (e.g. unemployment, crime, terrorism) and calls for “the deportation of any illegal aliens from the territory of Russia” (DPNI 2004). According to the DPNI, “migrants from the Caucasus states and from Central and South-Eastern Asia are the first part of the foreign expansion.” The group is closely associated with other nativist parties and extreme right groupuscules in the country, but it has so far not grown into a noticeable political force (Verkhovsky & Kozhevnikova 2005).
In contrast, Eastern European populist radical right parties target mainly the second largest group of enemies within the state but out- side the nation, i.e. indigenous ethnic minorities. All European countries have ethnic minorities among their populations. Some are well known and established, such as the Basques in Spain (and France) or the Kurds in Turkey, whereas the existence of others, such as the Livs in Latvia, is known only to some specialized ethnographers. Whether groups are recognized as an ethnic minority, officially by the state or unofficially in academic studies and the media, depends on a variety of factors, mostly
3
In general there are three conditions that make ethnic minorities more likely targets of xenophobic campaigns, both by populist radical right par- ties and by mainstream forces: (1) the ethnic minority is well organized and claims minority rights or protection; (2) it is linked to the majority
3 For example, whereas Czechoslovakia was considered a multinational state of two “eth- nicities,” the Czechs and the Slovaks, the Czech Republic is considered to be a homo- geneous country, including by most Czechs, despite the historic distinction between the territories of Bohemia and Moravia and the (short-lived) political mobilization of some “Moravians.”
subjective rather than objective.
ined” (Anderson 1983), so are minority nations or ethnic minorities.
In short, as majority nations are “imag-
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ethnicity of a bordering state; and (3) the ethnic minority is part of the former dominating group in the country. In some cases all three condi- tions will come together, which has given rise to particularly high levels of “inter-ethnic” tensions and xenophobic campaigns.
A prime example of such a case is the Hungarian-speaking minority in Central Eastern Europe, most notably in Romania and Slovakia. In these countries the perception of threat from ethnic minorities is particularly high; 32 percent and 43 percent, respectively, in 1998 (Haerpfer 2002: 100). This is wiped up by the populist radical right, which uses some of its most fanatic and vulgar rhetoric against the Hungarian-speakers. For example, at a party meeting Slovak SNS leader Slota referred to Hungarians as “a disgusting and deceitful nation” (in Gya ́rfa ́sˇova ́ 2002: 195).
The principal accusation against these minorities is that they are not loyal to the state they live in, but instead constitute “a fifth column” of their kin state. This charge was often expressed by Slota, for example, when he stated that “what we are experiencing from our Hungarian cit- izens borders on treason” (Cibulka 1999: 118). Similar allegations can be found in Bulgaria toward the Turkish-speaking minority. The Bulgar- ska national-radikalna partija (Bulgarian National Radical Party, BNRP) refers to them as a group “with an alien national consciousness” that should be expatriated (Mitev 1997: 77).
The importance of minority mobilization is often overlooked in studies of nativist campaigns. While it is obviously not the basis for being defined as the enemy, minority mobilization can make a specific group a more prominent target of populist radical right campaigns. The mobilization does not have to be by the minority itself; in many cases, pro-minority campaigns are only noted if (prominent) members of the “ethnic” major- ity become involved. Alternatively, foreign actors can make claims on the basis of a domestic minority, ranging from kin-states (e.g. Russia in the Baltics or Hungary in Central Eastern Europe) to international organi- zations and foreign states (as is mostly the case with weakly organized minorities, such as the Roma).
The importance of minority mobilization and claiming can be seen in the case of the Chinese minority, which has been present for decades in almost all European countries. Chinese are on all counts nonnative to populist radical right parties; moreover, they are often little integrated and connected to stories of crimes (e.g. “triads” and “snakehead gangs”). This notwithstanding, Chinese are almost never targeted in populist rad- ical right campaigns. While their numbers and growth might not be strik- ing, neither are those of some explicitly targeted minorities (notably the Jews). What sets the Chinese apart from most other ethnic minorities is their low level of political mobilization and the absence of collective claim
4
“southerners,” who can be both immigrants and indigenous ethnic minorities. Various populist radical right parties identify “southerners” as a key enemy within the state, but outside the nation. The infamous Rus- sian populist Zhirinovsky, for example, shows a fascination with “crimi- nal southerners,” referring mostly to people from the Caucasus and from Turkic countries, which borders on obsession (e.g. Umland 1997a). Sim- ilarly, the idiosyncratic populist Ivan Kramberger, who was killed by an insane person just before the Slovene parliamentary elections of 1992, called for the expulsion of “Southerners” (Juzˇnjaki) from Slovenia (Riz- man 1999).
In Italy the LN made itself the voice of the long-standing northern Italian prejudices towards their countrypersons from il Mezzogiorno, a derogative term to denote the southern part of Italy. Whether or not these terroni (see note 21, chapter 2) are included in the party’s “nation” varies with the self-definition of the party. Originally the LN was a region- alist party, identifying itself (lukewarmly) with the Italian nation. Since the party has invented the northern land of “Padania” and the Pada- nian nation, it increasingly treats meridionali (another insulting name for southerners) as foreigners.
3.2.3 Outside the state, within the nation
The enemy outside the state but within the nation is something of an odd category, but can and does exist in practice. Still, even in the case that parties will identify and vilify this category of enemy, it will not feature prominently in the propaganda or identity creation of the parties. Roughly speaking, we can distinguish two main groups of enemies within this category: countrypersons having moved abroad and kindred people living often in neighboring countries.
The first group is quite small and often involves artists, intellectuals
and politicians who have (temporarily) emigrated. Most of the time, these
groups and individuals are accused of the same vices as the native elites
within the country, i.e. corruption, leftism, and treason. For example, the
̈
FPO often criticizes Austrian representatives in international organiza-
tions for these vices, in particular the country’s European Commissioners
4 In instances where this changes, for example when Hong Kong was handed back to China and many Hong Kong Chinese demanded British citizenship or asylum status, the Chinese also become targets of nativist campaigns (see, for example, NF 1999).
making on the majority population.
A special category of the nonnative internal enemy is the so-called
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(see Heinisch 2003). The only additional qualifications this category of enemies could earn by living abroad are being hypocritical (e.g. sports- men living in tax havens and criticizing welfare cuts “back home”) and cowardice (“selling out” to the host country). Such sentiments have been quite common within German parties like the DVU and REP (see Mudde 2000a).
The second group, which is both more important and more numerous, refers to members of the nation “forced” to live outside of the “nation- state.” As many populist radical right parties consider the territory of their nation to substantially exceed that of their current state (see 6.2.1), they believe that many people in neighboring countries are in fact part of their nation. If this sentiment is not shared by (leading) individuals from the groups, a party claims, they will be attacked for being cowards, opportunists, or traitors.
This has been the case, for example, with moderate Hungarian- speaking intellectuals and politicians in Slovakia and Romania, who reject reunification with Hungary and identify as Slovak or Romanian
́
citizens. For example, MIEP leader Csurka has regularly attacked Be ́la
Marko ́, the moderate leader of the Uniunea Democrata ̆ Maghiara ̆ din Romaˆnia (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, UDMR), accusing him of betraying the Hungarian nation, while at the same time heralding La ́szlo ́ To ̋ke ́s, the leader of the radical faction within the party of Hungarian-speakers in Romania (e.g. Csurka 2004: 68). Similar, though less extreme, are radical Flemish nativist organizations aspiring to a reunification with the Netherlands, such as the VB (in its early years) and Were Di (Protect Yourself). They have been highly critical of the “unhis- torical” and “progressive” Dutch people, who were (rightly) seen as being unsupportive of the Flemish struggle and uninterested in reunification.
3.2.4 Outside the state, outside the nation
The populist radical right has an inherent distrust of the “external,” i.e. the outsider who is a nonnational living outside of the state. In many cases they will focus on particular outsiders, often the big neighbor or former occupier, although many consider virtually the whole “outside” with suspicion. For them the world is a hostile place, in which everyone is believed to conspire against their nation (and state). This not only includes foreign countries, particularly if historical tensions exist, but also international organizations like the EU and the UN (see chapters 7 and 8).
This paranoid worldview is particularly strong within the German and the Hungarian radical right. Regarding the latter, which includes the MIEP, the “Magyar nation” is seen as unique and surrounded by “a
sea of Slavs.” The reasons for the particularly hostile worldview of the German radical right, including the DVU and REP, lie in its revisionist view of the Second World War. During the Cold War, they believed that the US and USSR kept Germany divided to prevent it from becoming great again. In recent years, a similar conspiracy theory has been applied to the European Union (EU), under the guidance of France or the US (e.g. Mudde 2000a).
In Serbia, the paranoid worldview is a direct result of the international military actions against the country in reaction to the Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. As the Serbian populist radical right considers both territories key historical parts of Greater Serbia, the for- eign military actions are considered proof of an “international conspiracy against Serbs” that involves almost everyone, but in particular Germany, the Vatican, the CIA, Italy, and Turkey (Pribicˇevicˇ 1999: 200).
With regard to the European populist radical right as a whole, the for- mer occupiers hold a special place in its worldview. The parties accuse this particular external enemy of irredentism, i.e. the aim of reoccupying them. The fear of neighboring states and of irredentism was particularly widespread in transitory postcommunist Europe, where the borders and states were not as firmly established as in the West. However, during the 1990s the perceived threat from neighboring countries decreased sharply throughout the region, even though it remained relatively high in most countries. For example, while the group of people feeling threatened by neighboring states had dropped by roughly 40 percent in Romania, Hun- gary, and Poland by 1998, it still accounted for 27 percent, 23 percent, and 20 percent respectively (Haerpfer 2002: 98).
The fact that some former occupiers involve themselves with the pol- itics of their “lost territories,” mostly to guarantee the rights of “their kin,” certainly goes some way in explaining these relatively high num- bers. In a number of cases, leading politicians strengthened fears of irre- dentist claims by ambiguous statements about the borders of the nation. For example, the first postcommunist prime minister of Hungary, Jo ́szef Antall (1990–93), declared that he was “in spirit” the Prime Minis- ter of fifteen million Hungarians (whereas only some ten million live in Hungary); FIDESz-MPS leader Viktor Orba ́n made similar remarks, both as PM and as leader of the opposition. While these statements did not create the fears of Hungarian irredentism among the populist radi- cal right in neighboring countries, they certainly lent credence to their warnings that Hungary entertained such ambitions.
Among the populist radical right in Romania and Slovakia, fears of Hungarian irredentism have given rise to huge conspiracy theories.
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Already in 1992, the 4th Assembly of the Slovak SNS called upon the Slovak government, of which it was part, “to stop the penetration of the Hungarian irredentist elements and the forced Hungarisation of Slovaks in the South of Slovakia and the Hungarisation of municipal names” (in Gya ́rfa ́sˇova ́ 2002: 167). For the leadership of Vatra Romaneasca (Romanian Cradle) and its political arm PUNR, Romania was “the tar- get of a conspiracy of domestic and external forces that pursue the dis- memberment of its being [and] the degrading of human values that have characterized us all along our history” (in Gallagher 1997: 33). This conspiracy included also such unlikely actors as Max van der Stoel, then UN High Commissioner for Minorities, who was accused of “acting like a representative of the UDMR,” the political party of the Hungarian- speaking minority in Romania.
Similarly, the fear of Turkish irredentism is strong in countries like Bulgaria and Greece, and local populist radical right parties do much to increase it even further. In the 1994 manifesto of the BNRP, for exam- ple, the party stated “that since early in 1993 the fearsome ghost of the obscure Turkish oppression has been palpably looming over our country” (in Mitev 1997: 77). Greek populist radical right parties accuse MPs who declare themselves as “Turks” as traitors who need to be stripped of their mandate; the Greek Elliniko Metopo (Hellenic Front, EM) even wants to foster closer cooperation among peoples “enslaved by expansionist Turkey (Greeks, Kurds, Armenians)” (in Kolovos 2003: 56). A simi- lar Turkophobia can be found in Russia, particularly within the LDPR, whose leader believes that “Pan-Turkism threatens Russia” (Williams & Hanson 1999: 271).
The fear of Germany is fairly similar, particularly in the Czech Repub- lic and Poland, where large groups of the population still consider their Western neighbor as the main external threat (Haerpfer 2002: 94). Here alleged irredentist claims come from social movements, such as the Bund der Vertriebenen (League of Expellees) and the Sudetendeutsche Land- mannschaft (Sudeten German League), rather than from mainstream political parties, although the expellees hold some influence within the Christian democratic camp, particularly in Bavaria, where leading CSU politicians have supported some of their claims.
Within Poland anti-German sentiments are still widespread, particu- larly among Catholics and farmers (who fear land claims). Consequently, they find political voice in the two peasant parties, the PSL and Samoo- brona, and through various Catholic parties, some within larger center- right electoral blocks linked to the successors of the Solidarity trade union (e.g. Lebioda 2000). Although Germanophobia is a bit less widespread among the Czech populace, the situation at the elite level is even more extreme than in Poland. Almost all established Czech parties have at
times voiced anti-German sentiments, most notably the ardently Ger-
ˇ
manophobe communist Komunisticka ́ strana Cech a Moravy (Commu-
ˇ
nist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, KSCM).
Still, in both cases populist radical right parties belong to the most anti-German parties in the country. Already in 1990, at a “Conference of the Polish Right,” Marciej Giertych, now an MEP for the Polish LPR and the father of the party leader, declared that Poland should be the most decisive element in the self-defense of Europe against the German dominance” (Rudnicki 2000: 11–12). In the Czech Republic, Miroslav
ˇ
Sla ́dek, then leader of the SPR-RSC and not known for his subtlety, once
shouted at a party demonstration that “we can regret that we killed too few Germans in the war” (CTK 21/06/1998).
But Germanophobia is not limited to the Eastern part of the European continent. In some Western European countries Germans are (among) the least liked Europeans, and fears of German expansionism continue to exist (e.g. in Denmark and France). While not a major issue, some regional populist radical right parties will indulge in Germanophobia at times, particularly linked to the process of European integration. For example, the Greek EM refers to the EU as “the new Roman Empire” and claims that “very soon it will be proven that the Euro, EMU and EU are geopolitical fabrications of Germany and France, enabling them to become the ‘guardians’ of the whole of Europe, and obey the needs of German capital for expansion and domination” (Charitos 2001).
In many Eastern European countries, Russia is still considered to be external enemy number one, despite the fact that the percentages of Rus- sophobe people are decreasing (Haerpfer 2002: 91). Not surprisingly, populist radical right parties are among the most open and rabid anti- Russian political actors in the region. This is particularly so in Esto- nia, Latvia and Poland, where Russophobia extends far into the political mainstream as well. In sharp contrast, in a number of Slavic countries the Russian Federation is seen as an ally rather than an enemy. For parties like the Srpska radikalne stranke (Serbian Radical Party, SRS) Russia is the “Slavic brother” that helped defend Serbia against “Western aggres- sion.” Similarly pro-Russian sentiments can be found in the Bulgarian BNRP and the Slovak SNS (e.g. Fried 1997).
In addition to neighbors and former occupiers, a primary role in the cat- egory of external enemies within the populist radical right is reserved for the US and the international organizations allegedly dominated by it (e.g. NATO, UN, WTO). It is fair to say that, “in general, anti-Americanism is now at the top of the agenda of extreme right parties all over Europe” (Rensmann 2003: 119). Traditionally, the most fiercely anti-American
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populist radical right parties are to be found in Southern Europe, in coun- tries with a significant anti-American mainstream (e.g. Fabbrini 2002). For example, the French FN is one of many French political parties to espouse strong Americanophobia, as is the new Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos (Popular Orthodox Rally, LAOS) in Greece. The tiny Ital- ian MS-FT is even obsessively anti-American, considering, for example, NATO as an American instrument of the colonization of Europe.
In Eastern Europe, while Russophobe sentiments are decreasing, Americanophobia is on the rise (Haerpfer 2002: 96). Not surprisingly, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia tops the poll with a staggering 85 percent in 1998, while, in the short period of 1992–98, sharp increases have occurred in Slovakia (+19 percent), Ukraine (+17 percent), Belarus (+13 percent), and the Czech Republic (+10 percent). Particularly in the former Soviet countries, anti-Americanism is also widespread at the elite level, especially on the radical left and right. Both sides will support pan- Slavic cooperation, at least partly to constitute a counter-weight to the US (e.g. LDPR, Slovak SNS, SRS).
However, not all populist radical right parties are anti-American; in fact, some are explicitly pro-American! Jo ̈rg Haider has long been fas- cinated by the US, seeking inspiration at Harvard summer schools and in the Republican Party (e.g. Ho ̈belt 2003). The VB has become virtu- ally the only open supporter of American foreign policy in contempo- rary Belgium. During the invasion of Afghanistan some party members (including leader Filip Dewinter) demonstrated in Antwerp in front of a banner reading: “Bush is right! Stop Islam terrorism!” And in Poland, where Americanophobia is not widespread anyway, the LPR prefers the US over the EU, above all because of the importance of Christianity in the former.
3.3 Three special enemies: the Jew, the Muslim, and the Rom
Within the populist radical right, three groups perform particularly important, if quite different, functions in the self-definition of the ingroup. Traditionally, “the Jew” has been the personification of moder- nity, and through anti-Semitism all the perceived evils of modernization were opposed (e.g. Cohn 1971). In sharp contrast, “the Rom” is the per- sonification of “the barbarian,” and through Romophobia the modernity oftheingroupisemphasized.Toalargeextent,“theMuslim”isalsoabar- barian, although she or he is more clearly linked to modernity. Whereas “the Rom” has not yet reached modernity, “the Muslim” lives in it, but consciously rejects it. Interestingly, it is particularly in their Islamophobia that populist radical right parties present themselves as fierce defenders of liberal democracy, including various freedoms that until recently have been secondary to these parties (e.g. equality of sexes, separation of state and religion; see also 4.2).
3.3.1 “The Jew”: anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitism has always taken a special place in the wide world of prej- udices. Whereas most “Others” are considered as relatively unintelligent and powerless, and their threat is primarily seen in terms of their num- bers, “the Jew” is an atypical enemy, one who is clever and cunning, and whose threat lies not in the numbers of the many, but in the power of the few. Hence, the Polish anti-Semitic “joke” of 1990: “There are almost no Jews in Poland, but why do all of them have to be in the government?” (in Gerrits 1993: 111). It is also in this perspective that La ́szlo ́ Karsai’s provocative but accurate observation should be read:
With a little exaggeration we could say that the famous financial guru George Soros, who maintains close, friendly relations with the leaders of the Alliance of Free Democrats, and who comes from a Hungarian-Jewish family, is worth several hundred thousand virtual Jews. (1999: 142)5
Hence, the (not so) “paradoxical” existence of what Paul Lendvai (1972) has coined “anti-Semitism without Jews.”6 How this classic anti-Semitic conspiracy unfolds can be read in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the notorious forgery of the Czarist secret service of over one hundred years ago, which continues to inspire anti-Semites around the globe (e.g. Bern- stein 1935).
Within the typology presented above, anti-Semitism normally falls in categories 2 and 4, i.e. outside of the nation but both inside and outside of the state. Anti-Semitism is most often expressed with reference to inter- national politics, particularly when related to Israel and the United States. A blunt example was given by PRM leader Vadim Tudor, in a speech he gave in Libya: “The United States is a colony of Israel . . . In my mind’s eye I see a little mouse pulling a gigantic elephant behind it on a very long chain. This is Israel and the United States” (in Haaretz 07/04/2004). But in many instances the anti-Semitic conspiracy links the two groups, i.e. the internal and the external Jews, seeing (allegedly) influential Jews who live within the state as the fifth column of “International Jewry.”
- 5 Similarly,LeonardWeinberghasreferredtoSorosas“agodsendforfar-rightpartylead- ers” (2003: 298).
- 6 DmitriVasiliev,aformerleaderoftheRussianextremerightgroupingPamyat(Memory), has provided an anti-Semitic “logic” for the existence of anti-Semitism without Jews: “It is not necessary to be Jewish to be a Jew . . . Everybody in power is a Jew, or their wives are” (in Lee 2000: 306).
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In Western Europe open anti-Semitism has remained rare in the post- war era. Despite different interpretations of the war period between and within countries, there exists a strong consensus that the Holocaust was the epitome of evil and that anti-Semitism is unacceptable. Obviously, there can be discussion about what exactly constitutes anti-Semitism, particularly with respect to critique of the politics of the state of Israel, but clear and open anti-Semitism is not expressed commonly by the polit- ical mainstream, including most relevant populist radical right parties. The recent wave of “new anti-Semitism” that has hit Western Europe is more exclusively focused on the Arab–Israeli conflict, and is primar- ily expressed within the Muslim immigrant and (intellectual) left-wing communities (e.g. Taguieff 2004; Wistrich 2003).
The key proponents of (old) anti-Semitism in Western Europe were the usual suspects: marginal extremist groups, like neo-Nazis and some com- munists, as well as certain fringe Christian fundamentalists. Particularly within the neo-Nazi groups the most outrageous anti-Semitic conspira- cies abound; virtually all leading Nazis have been “outed” as being Jewish (including Adolf Eichmann, Joseph Goebbels, and Adolf Hitler himself), while the Holocaust is said to have been invented by “the Jews” to black- mail the Germans/Europeans/whites (hence the term “Holohoax”).
In some Western European populist radical right parties anti-Semitism might not be overt, but more or less coded messages indicate that it is nonetheless latent in their propaganda. For example, after a negative experience with a television interview the late British radical right politi- cian John Tyndall, a former leader of both the NF and the BNP, said: “One glance at Mr. Lapping (the producer) was enough to convince us that his ancestors originated in lands far from those where Saxon yeomen and bowmen were bred” (in Nugent 1980: 219). More openly, the Greek LAOS has regularly referred to the alleged dark power of Israel and the Jewish lobby (see Kolovos 2003).
One of the few larger Western European parties to use coded anti- Semitic messages is the French FN, although anti-Semitism is not a core feature of its ideology. In the party literature and leadership speeches terms like “internationalists,” “cosmopolitans,” or “lobbies” feature with great frequency (e.g. Simmons 2003; Marcus 2000). In the case of Le Pen, anti-Semitism has often been part of his personal attacks on indi- vidual politicians. For example, he has referred to the “dual nationality” of the former Minister of Labor, Lionel Stoleru, who never made any secret of his Jewish background (e.g. Mayer and Sineau 2002; Birnbaum 1992).
The West European party most often associated with anti-Semitism is
̈
the FPO, and particularly its former leader Jo ̈rg Haider (e.g. Heinisch 2003; Wodak 2002). Again, while anti-Semitic statements have been
made by party officials, and tolerated by the leadership, it is not a key
ideological feature of the party. In addition to a strategic move to satisfy
the anti-Semitic part of the party electorate and membership, Haider’s
willingness to tolerate anti-Semitism can best be seen as a strategy of cop-
ing with the guilt of the Holocaust (Peri 2001), which one can also find
among German populist radical rightists like former REP leader Franz
7
diverse. In some countries, such as the Czech Republic or Slovenia, anti-Semitism is as unacceptable and marginal as it is in most Western European countries. In the largest group of countries, however, a certain tolerance towards anti-Semitism exists among parts of the masses and the elites. For example, in both Hungary and Lithuania almost one-quarter of the population can be classified as anti-Semitic (e.g. Kiaulakis 2005; Kova ́cs 1999). In Poland, approximately half of the population declares negative feelings towards Jews and Israelis, a percentage that has remained largely stable over the past decade (Pankowski & Kornak 2005: 179).
Anti-Semitism in postcommunist Europe has a wide variety of ideo- logical sources; some are shared with Western Europe, others are more particular to the region. Communist anti-Zionism and pan-Slavic anti- Western sentiments are particularly relevant for some smaller, mostly post-Soviet radical right groups. For example, Oleh Tyahnybok, leader of the Ukrainian populist radical right party Svoboda (Liberty), and a former member of the center-right Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine) par- liamentary faction of president Viktor Yushenko, called upon Ukrainians to resist the “Russian-Jewish mafia” that, according to him, rules Ukraine (Ukrayinska Pravda 21/07/04).
On average, Eastern European populist radical right parties are much more (openly) anti-Semitic than their brethren in the West. For example, the Serbian SRS published the infamous Protocols as a supplement to their official biweekly publication Velika Srbija (Great Serbia) in May 1994 (Sekelj 1998: 13). Of particular prominence are “Judeo-Communist” conspiracy theories, which have a long tradition within nativist circles in the region (e.g. Gerrits 1995). Volen Siderov, the virulently anti-Semitic leader of the Bulgarian Ataka party, openly preaches such conspiracy theories. At the “International Conference on Global Problems of World History,” among other notorious anti-Semites and revisionists like the
7 Interestingly,thefamous“Nazihunter”andfellow-Austrian,thelateSimonWiesenthal, defended Haider against accusations of anti-Semitism, saying that “Haider never said anything against Israel and has never said anything anti-Semitic” (in Sully 1997: 222).
Scho ̈nhuber.
The situation of anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe is much more
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SwissJu ̈rgenGrafandtheAmericanformerGrandWizardoftheKnights of the Ku Klux Klan, David Duke, Siderov (2002) proclaimed: “Jewish bankers such as Schiff and Kuhn financed the Bolshevik revolution which brought destruction and misery to the Russian people and ruined the Russian economy, thus eliminating a powerful competitor of the Anglo- Saxon powers.”
Even more contemporary anti-Semitic conspiracies are highly present too. In a bizarre merger of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, the Ataka website sported a picture of Bulgaria with small Turkish and Israeli flags and the text “for sale” on it, indicating that the country was being sold out to Turkey and Israel. And in some parties anti-Semitism even forms one of the most vicious and central ideological features. Not surprisingly, this is the case in countries where anti-Semitism is generally widespread, such as Hungary, Poland, and Russia. One of the most rabid anti-Semites in
́
Eastern Europe is MIEP leader Istva ́n Csurka, who was expelled from the
then ruling party MDF in 1993 for publishing the essay “Wake Up, Hun- garians,” in which he accused a “dwarf minority” of frustrating Hungary’s national destiny (e.g. Pataki 1992). This has been a dominant theme in his publications.
Like practically all anti-Semites, Csurka is convinced that “Interna-
tional Jewry” is involved in a worldwide conspiracy and operates through
́ American henchmen (see also chapter 8). But Csurka and MIEP are able
to relate the Jewish conspiracy to virtually every topic (e.g. Weaver 2006; Marsovszky 2002; Mihancsik 2001; Varga 2001). For example, prior to the referendum in December 2004, when Hungarians voted on whether to grant citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary, the party paper, Magyar Fo ́rum (02/11/2004), declared that those who cam- paigned against granting citizenship to Hungarians from abroad did so because:
Others, foreigners, need the places that a few Hungarians arriving from beyond the borders might take. [These people feel that] Hungarians should not come here, so that there will be room for the Jews who will arrive from Russia, Ukraine and the Near East. [They’ll do] Anything to prevent a Hungarian from getting a run- down farmhouse, so that the suburbs of the wealthy can be filled. (in Weaver 2006: 101)
As in many other respects, the populist radical right in Eastern Europe also provides the most bizarre examples of anti-Semitism. The best known is LDPR leader Zhirinovsky, who is both the perpetrator and victim of anti-Semitic attacks (e.g. Shenfield 2001: 94–6). Allegedly, his biological father was a Jewish Russian by the name of Edelshtein, which Zhirinovsky long side-stepped by describing his ethnic origins in quasi-comical terms: “My mother was Russian, my father was a lawyer.” Despite, or maybe because of, its leader’s personal background, the LDPR programs reject the “pathological anti-Semitism” of the Russian extreme right move- ments (e.g. LDPR 1995). This implies that the party regards the various anti-Semitic remarks of its members, including Zhirinovsky himself, as normal (e.g. Shenfield 2001).
A remarkable development is the emergence of philo-Semitic state- ments within a few populist radical right parties. While it has been more common that nativist parties would refer positively to the “Jewish state,” regarding it as the present-day example of their own preferred nativist state model, the similarities have been taken to the extreme in Serbia. During his populist radical right phase, SPO leader Drasˇkovicˇ spoke of “the centuries long history of Jewish-Serbian martyrdom,” and wrote: “It is by the hands of the same executioners that both Serbs and Jews have been exterminated at the same concentration camps, slaughtered at the same bridges, burned alive in the same ovens, thrown together into the
8
in the literature of the Belgian VB, which has never openly expressed anti-
9
same pits” (in Zivkovic 2000: 73).
The most clear and convincing examples of philo-Semitism are found
Semitism (Mudde 2000a).
sented itself as the defender of the Flemish Jews and an ardent supporter of the state of Israel. In an interview with a conservative Jewish weekly from New York, Dewinter boasted that “very often we were the only political group defending Israel, both in publications and in parliament” (The Jewish Week 12/09/2005). The former is particularly remarkable as the Jewish community of Antwerp includes a relatively large section of Hassidic Jews, who are highly visible with their black robes and hats, and against whom much of the VB’s critique of the alleged resistance to assimilation of the Muslim population could also be directed.
In recent years the party has increasingly pre-
A probably unique combination of anti-Semitism and philo-Semitism has recently been shown by Romanian PRM leader Tudor, who until then mainly “excelled” in Jew-baiting. But to the surprise of almost everyone, including his fellow party members, Tudor radically changed his position on Jews and the Holocaust in 2004. He wrote an open letter apologizing to “all the Jews who were hurt by my exaggerations.” Probably most shock- ing was Tudor’s decision to hire a Jewish Israeli campaign manager in
- 8 This theme was later taken up, and elaborated upon, by the Serbian–Jewish Friendship Society (Drustvo srpsko-jevrejskog prijateljstva), a bizarre collection of Serbian nativist intellectuals and members of the Serbian-Jewish community (e.g. Zivkovic 2000; Sekelj 1998).
- 9 Anti-SemitismhasnotbeenpartofthediscourseoftheItalianLNeither,anditsleader Umberto Bossi even declared that “the Lega is a friend of the Jews,” after a Catholic theologian of Jewish descent (Luis Marsiglia) had been the victim of an anti-Semitic attack (Merkl 2003b: 31).
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2002, with a close second in Eyal Arad’s acceptance of the offer. Arad was supposed to help Tudor win the presidency in 2004. However, the reason that “Vadim 2004” gave for this unorthodox move was quite orthodox: “It is clear that no one can do anything in a state like Romania without American or Israeli advice” (in Haaretz 07/04/2004).
3.3.2 Islamophobia
At first sight, it looks like Islamophobia is the radical right’s anti-Semitism of the twenty-first century. The centrality of anti-Islam sentiment in their propaganda lends credence to this assertion for most members of the pop- ulist radical right party family, particularly in Western Europe. While “the Jew” or “International Jewry” was the key enemy and scapegoat for the various types of nativist in the (early) twentieth century, particularly the Nazis, “the Muslim” or “Islam” is the key enemy of their contemporary counterparts. Moreover, like anti-Semitism the Islamophobic discourse of the populist radical right also relates to enemies outside the nation but both within and beyond the boundaries of the state. However, unlike anti-Semitism, Islamophobia is a common form of prejudice, in which the enemy is feared because of its numbers, not its qualities – in fact, Muslims (like “Gypsies” or “negroes”) are mostly considered in nega- tive terms (lazy, fanatic, etc.). In other words, whereas a few Jews could constitute a significant threat, a few Muslims could not.
Islamophobia has taken center-stage in the Western world since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, and the following devel- opments in the ongoing “war on terrorism,” deepened and extended this sentiment. As a consequence, Islamophobia is certainly not an exclusive feature of the populist radical right, but reaches deep into the political mainstream of most Western countries. However, populist radical right parties tend to stand out in both the “quality” and the quantity of their Islamophobia. For various European parties, from the Belgian VB to the Bulgarian Ataka, the main national and international threat today comes from “Islam,” which they describe as an inherently fundamentalist and imperialist religion-cum-ideology.
In this world view, where Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civi- lizations” (1993) functions as a modern Protocols,10 “the West” is at war with an imperialist Muslim world. Expressing a view that finds support
̈
well beyond the populist radical right, FPO leader Haider stated in the
early 1990s: “The social order of Islam is opposed to our Western values”
10 Almost all Islamophobes refer to “The Clash of Civilizations” to legitimize their views. This includes not just populist radical right parties like the fiercely Turkophobic Greek EM or the strongly xenophobic Belgian VB, but also purely Islamophobic politicians like the late Pim Fortuyn and the neoliberal populist LPF (e.g. LPF 2003). (in Betz 2003b: 84). All major conflicts seem to fit this “Clash,” includ- ing the (civil) wars in the Balkans. According to LN leader Bossi, com- bining anti-Americanism with Islamophobia, the “Christian Serbs” were attacked by NATO because they represented “the ultimate obstacle to the advance of the global American and Muslim empires” (in Betz 2003b: 84). The Spanish DN portrayed its vision of the clash under the heading “Europe in danger,” picturing Albania, Morocco and Turkey as crabs attacking Europe.
But in addition to the attribution of various international ills to Islam, it is also the focus of pronounced domestic anxiety. LDPR leader Zhiri- novsky, an Orientalist by training, stated almost fifteen years ago: “Islam does not still stand in front of the door, it already marches through the cities of Europe” (1992: 27). Some ten years later, the Greek Hellenic Front (HF) presents an even more chilling image: “The clash of civi- lizations takes now the form of a civil war in the interior of the Western countries” (HF 2001). This civil war is between the hospitable and na ̈ıve Europeans and the bloodthirsty Muslim immigrants in Europe, who are seen as “the fifth column of international Islam.” Dramatic events like the “race” riots in France in November 2005 are placed within this broader
̈
framework. According to the FPO, they were an “Islamic Intifada against
the French secular state” (Neue Freie Zeitung 10/11/2005).
Particularly among Western European populist radical right parties, Islamophobia seems to have led to a new emphasis on the Christian essence of Europe (or the Occident). Parties like the Belgian VB or the Italian LN used to largely ignore the issue of religion, but refer to the Christian roots of their own culture increasingly since the 1990s. In addi- tion, they stress the alleged incompatibility of Islam with the basic tenets
̈
of the European or native culture. The Austrian FPO even overcame the
long-standing anticlerical position of the third Lager (camp) to become one of the staunchest supporters of orthodox Catholicism, most notably in the person of Kurt Krenn, the Bishop of Sankt Po ̈lten.
In Eastern Europe the link between (Catholic and Orthodox) Chris- tianity and the populist radical right has always been very strong. The link is strongest in the Polish LPR, which combines Polish nativism with orthodox Catholicism at the core of its ideology, but parties like the Slovak SNS or Croat HSP are also staunchly Catholic. In the Orthodox coun- tries the synergy between religion and nation is even more complete, as
11
most Orthodox churches are national churches.
Thus, parties like the
11 Traditionally, the links between state and religion have also been strong in Protestant Northern Europe, especially in the Scandinavian countries (e.g. Madeley 2006; Minken- berg 2002a). Interestingly, the Danish DFP wants the Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church to become the “National Church” of Denmark (DFP n.d.).
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Bulgarian Ataka, the Romanian PRM, or the Russian LDPR define their nation as essentially Orthodox Christian.
As most of these countries are not (yet) confronted by mass immigra- tion from Islamic countries, Islamophobia is not (yet) prominent within the discourses of the local populist radical right parties. Exceptions are the Bulgarian and Serbian parties, which consider internal Muslim minori- ties (“Turks” and “Albanians” respectively) as a national threat and a fifth column of a neighboring country. In a bizarre combination of Chris- tian defense and Islamophobia, the Bulgarian BNRP demanded a ban on Muslims adopting children from Christian families (Mitev 1997).
Interestingly, there is at least one exception to the Islamophobic pop- ulist radical right in Europe, the Croatian neo-pravasˇi parties HSP and HSP-1861 (Irvine 1997). In the 1990s the governing HDZ struggled for the return of the Croatian Banovina of 1939, including only the “Croat” parts of Herzegovina, while the Greater Croatia of the neo-pravasˇi fol- lows the borders of the wartime Independent State of Croatia (NDH), including the “Bosnian Muslim” parts of Herzegovina. And even though Croatia should be for the Croats, the neo-pravasˇi do not want to cleanse the country of Bosnian Muslims, whom they consider to be Croats of the Muslim faith. In fact, the HSP fiercely campaigned against Tud ̄man’s Bosnian policy because it drove a wedge between Croats and Bosnian Muslims, who, in the eyes of Paraga and Djapic, should be natural allies in the fight against the true enemy, the Serbs. It has even been said that the HOS, the HSP militia that fought quasi-independently in Bosnia in the early 1990s, counted “numerous Muslim members” (Irvine 1997: 58).
3.3.3 Romaphobia
The most widely targeted ethnic minority in Central and Eastern Europe is the Roma, who are more commonly known under the derogatory term “Gypsies.” Particularly in countries where the Roma minority is relatively numerous, such as in the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and Bulgaria and Romania, anti-Roma sentiment and violence are common (see Mudde 2005b; Ku ̈rti 1998). While pop- ulist radical right parties are certainly not the only political actors tar- geting the Roma in their propaganda, they are often the most vocal and extreme (e.g. Mudde 2005a). Thus, in much of Central Eastern Europe, Roma constitute the main enemies within the state but outside of the nation.
ˇ
For the Czech SPR-RSC the Roma have always been the main internal
enemy, with the possible exception of the indigenous political elite. In its
1999 draft program, the party states: “The Gypsies . . . freely kill, rape
and rob ordinary citizens . . . The vast majority of the Gypsies parasite
ˇ
on the society” (SPR-RSC 1999). Vadim Tudor and the PRM espouse
the most vicious and vulgar Romaphobia in Romania, a country which has a particularly dubious history in this respect. Ataka leader Sidorov even promised to “stop the Gypsy genocide against Bulgarians” (Reuters 25/06/2005). The Slovak SNS originally left the Roma largely alone, focusing mainly on Czechs, Hungarians, and Jews in the early 1990s. But under the leadership of Ja ́n Slota, Rom-bashing became a “specialty” of the party (e.g. Fried 1997).
More remarkable is the situation in Hungary, a country with one of the largest Rom populations in the region and where nativist discourse stretches far into the mainstream. Here, Roma feature only scantily, even
́
in the propaganda of the populist radical right MIEP. While Csurka
has made some (implicit) Romaphobic statements, claiming for example that Hungary has declined because of “genetic causes” (Barany 2002: 314), his obsessive anti-Semitism probably prevents him from playing
12
although several return in most national settings. One of the most heard prejudices is that Roma are inherently “primitive”; in this sense, the pop- ulist radical right largely works with the same stereotypes as many Western Romaphiles, but come to a fundamentally opposite evaluation. Slota has called Roma “children of nature” (in Gya ́rfa ́sˇova ́ 2002: 191), with whom one can only deal with “a big whip and a small yard” (in Cibulka 1999: 126).
Another key prejudice against the Roma is that they are (inherently) criminal. The discourses of Central and East European populist radical right parties are full of references to “the Gypsy mafia,” “criminal Gypsy gangs,” or “Gypsy thieves.” SNS leader Slota has claimed that 70 percent of the Slovak Roma are criminal, obviously not substantiating that claim
ˇ
with any statistical material. SPR-RSC leader Sladek, probably the most
Romaphobic politician in Europe, even went so far as to state in his par- liamentary opening speech of 1994 that “Gypsy children” were criminal
13
the “Roma card” more regularly.
The prejudices against the Roma are diverse and partly nation-specific,
because of the mere fact that they were born (Barany 2002).
Politicians
12 For example, one of his most openly Romaphobic statements mainly portrayed Roma as na ̈ıve henchmen of the Jews, and was therefore primarily anti-Semitic (see Chiantera- Stutte & Peto ̋ 2003). Similar arguments can be found in other parties in Eastern Europe: for example, the Bulgarian BNRP sees the Roma as pawns of the CIA, the Open Society Institute (e.g. = Jews), and the Freemasons (see Bu ̈chsenschu ̈tz & Georgiev 2001).
13 ˇ
Other prominent members of the SPR-RSC have made similar remarks, such as MP Jan
Vik, who stated in October 1993: “We can’t wait for the country to be flooded by crime.
88 Issues
from Slovak SNS honorary chairman and MP Vitazoslav Mo ́ric to Roma- nian PRM leader Tudor have called for the internment of Roma in “reser- vations” or “settlements” to solve the problem of “Gypsy crime.” In this discourse the parties combine their nativist and authoritarian features and play into the widespread prejudices about Roma crime within their native societies.
A third prejudice depicts the Roma as social parasites. The distressingly high levels of unemployment among Roma are not regarded as a sign of discrimination by the majority populations, but are instead considered proof of the claimed parasitic nature of Roma. The Slovak SNS employed this theme in the 1998 parliamentary elections with the slogan, “Let’s vote for a Slovakia without parasites.” While this was one of the more subtle Romaphobe expressions of the party, the message was not lost on the average Slovak voter, despite party leader Slota’s claim that the term “parasite” applied to “quite a lot of Gypsies but also to whites” (in Fisher 2000: 42).
A fourth and final prejudice is that Roma are the beneficiaries of state discrimination. This discourse parallels the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the populist radical right in the Western part of the continent, increasingly employed in the East as well. Populist radical right parties, like the Czech NS, claim that “we are discriminated against in our own country.”
In addition to targeting the Roma, this prejudice is cloaked in populism in an attack on the political elite, who are held responsible for reverse discrimination in favor of the Roma at the expense of their “own people.” Some parties also use it in their nativist struggle against foreign influences, particularly of “Western” countries and organizations such as the EU and the US, which pressure domestic politicians into adopting measures of positive discrimination towards Roma.
In countries where Roma (and Sinti) constitute just a tiny minority, including all Western European countries, anti-Roma sentiments are less prominent, but still latently present (e.g. Sigona 2005). This was evi- dent in antirefugee campaigns after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which specifically targeted Roma refugees from Eastern Europe. For example, the DLVH targeted a Macedonian Roma woman in a campaign against Schein-Asylanten (sham refugees) in the German city of Cologne (Bru ̈ck 2005: 32). However, in most cases populist radical right parties played only a minor role in the Romaphobic campaigns, which were mainly
At age three, a Gypsy will see his drunk father, his prostitute mother, and all we try to do for him will prove in vain. His parents tell him the best way of life is stealing” (in Sobotka 2003: 28). led by mainstream tabloid media and local politicians (e.g. Grillo 2005; Nordberg 2004).
3.4 Conclusion
If one accepts German philosopher Carl Schmitt’s definition of politics as the distinction between friends and foes, populist radical right par- ties are quintessentially political. They divide the world into friends and foes on the basis of the three key features of their ideology: nativism, populism, and, to a lesser extent, authoritarianism. In most cases, while attention is paid primarily to enemies within the state, but outside of the nation (notably immigrants and indigenous minorities), the biggest threat is often ascribed to the enemies within the state and within the nation (i.e. the corrupt and traitorous elites).
In their propaganda, foes are far more prevalent than friends. The populist radical right is a clear example of the politics of fear, which has become even more pronounced in Europe with the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The politics of fear plays an important role in homogenizing the ingroup and polarizing the relationship towards outgroups. Given that virtually all these ingroup–outgroup distinctions have a strong moral dimension, compromise is almost impossible (after all, this would “contaminate” the pure ingroup). It is important to realize that this type of thinking is not limited to the populist radical right. The politics of fear is a key strategy in both terrorist and antiterrorist cam- paigns (e.g. Stern 2004). Moreover, much of the official discourse on issues such as crime and immigration is based on a politics of fear (e.g. Furedi 2005; Huysmans 2004).
However, the friend–foe distinction is also an extreme form of a more common ingroup–outgroup differentiation. As such, the various enemies and related prejudices perform different functions in defining the ingroup ex negativo. For example, the description of some enemies as primitive (e.g. Muslim and Roma) helps to define the ingroup as advanced and modern. Similarly, the targeting of criminal enemies (e.g. elites, deal- ers, immigrants, Roma) indirectly says that the ingroup is honest. The identification of parasitic enemies (e.g. Roma and Sozialschmarotzer) pro- claims the ingroup as hard-working and social. In this way, the enemies provide implicit and intuitive substance to an otherwise vaguely defined “nativeness.”
