Populist radical right democracy
Whose democracy is it anyway? (Maryniak 2002: 107)
6.1 Introduction
Although the populist radical right is not antidemocratic in a procedural sense, as argued in chapter 1, core tenets of its ideology stand in fun- damental tension with liberal democracy. Various authors have discussed this tension, although mostly at an abstract level without much reference to concrete positions of the parties in question (e.g. Betz 2004; Decker 2004; see also Lipset 1955). To understand the nature and scope of this tension, we must examine the societal and systemic consequences of the three key features of the populist radical right: nativism, authoritarianism and populism.
The following sections will discuss the populist radical right par- ties’ views on nativist democracy, authoritarian democracy, and populist democracy, respectively. In the conclusion the populist radical right view of democracy will be constructed and compared to the key features of liberal democracy in general, and the way they are implemented in con- temporary European countries in particular. This exercise should also help provide a clearer insight into the key question on the mind of many authors and, indeed, readers: how dangerous are populist radical right parties for liberal democracy?
6.2 Nativist democracy: it’s our country!
The key concept of the populist radical right is nativism, the ideology that a state should comprise “natives” and that “nonnatives” are to be treated with hostility. Like all ideologues, nativists are torn between the ideal and the practice, the dream and the reality. While they dream of a utopian monocultural state, i.e. a “pure” nation-state, most parties would settle for a more attainable ethnocracy.
6.2.1 Monoculturalism: the utopia of the pure nation-state
The single most striking similarity in the propaganda of populist radical right parties worldwide is their main slogan: “Britain for the British” (NF), “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians” (Ataka), “Netherlands for the Netherlanders!” (CP’86), “Slovenia for the Slovenes” (SNS), etc. These slogans summarize the core goal of every nativist: “Our own state for our own nation.” According to nativists, true democracy is only possible within a true nation-state. As Koen Koch (1991) has elaborated, the full nationalist doctrine includes two additional elements: internal homog- enization and external exclusiveness. Or, in the words of the foremost scholar of nationalism, “all Ruritanians, as far as possible, into the sacred Ruritanian homeland, and all or virtually all non-Ruritanians, out of it!” (Gellner 1995: 6). In today’s world, we find few populist radical right parties that will openly call for both.
The essence of internal homogenization is caught in the infamous slogan of German right-wing extremists: “Deutschland den Deutschen, Ausla ̈nder raus!” (Germany for the Germans, foreigners out!). Not only should “our state” be ruled by (people of) “our nation,” “we” should be its exclusive inhabitants. This nativist aim remains the ideal of most members of the populist radical right party family today, but very few parties openly profess it without qualification. All parties continue to call for the expulsion of certain groups of nonnationals, mostly illegal aliens and criminal “foreigners” (sometimes including naturalized immi- grants). But particularly among the more relevant parties in Western Europe the undeniable reality of multiethnic society has sunk in and some degree of ethnic diversity within the nation-state is grudgingly accepted (see 6.2.2). So, while the Belgian VB called for the return of second- and third-generation “aliens” in its infamous seventy-point program (Dewin- ter 1992: 29–30), recent manifestos no longer include this demand (e.g. VB 2005b, 2004b).
In Eastern Europe calls for internal homogenization were not uncom- mon in the years following the collapse of communism. In a region with a history of population transfers, the call of the Bulgarian BNRP to drive all the “Turks” out of Bulgaria and replace them with “Bulgarians” from Moldova and other countries might not even have sounded completely absurd to many Bulgarians (Eminov 1997). And in the former Yugoslavia some nativists did not stop at calls for population transfers, but openly supported genocide. Leading politicians of Croatian and Serbian populist radical right parties called for the forceful expulsion and, if necessary, killing of Serbs and Croats, respectively (e.g. Irvine 1995). Campaigning
ˇ
in 1992, SRS leader Sesˇelj stated:
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Albanians should be driven out of Kosovo to Albania, similar actions should
be taken with the Muslims in Sandzˇak, Hungarians who were our brothers-in-
́
arms may remain, but the Hungarians who followed Agoston (the independent
Hungarian leader) have no place in Serbia, and (all) Croats must be expelled from Serbia (in Bugajski 1994: 150).
Only a few populist radical right parties in Western Europe openly express the wish for external exclusiveness, i.e. all people and territo- ries of the nation should be part of the state (Koch 1991). Initially, both the Belgian VB and the Dutch CP’86 aspired to a Greater-Netherlands in which the Netherlands, Belgian Flanders (including Brussels), and French or South Flanders (the area around the city of Lille) would be “reunited” (e.g. Mudde 2000a). However, in recent years the VB no longer calls for reunification and appears content with Flemish indepen- dence and “an as close as possible connection with the Netherlands and South Flanders” (VB 2004b).
Similarly, German parties like the DVU and REP would call for “true” German reunification, including not just Mitteldeutschland (Central Ger- many), i.e. the former German Democratic Republic or East Germany, but also the “real” Ostdeutschland (East Germany), referring to areas in the current Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine that were part of the German empire in 1937. Interestingly, calls for a new Anschluβ with Austria are not made (openly) by these parties (e.g. Mudde 2000a). And in Greece, the tiny HF wants to liberate all “enslaved Greek Fatherlands” and reunite them with Greece (in Kolovos 2003: 56).
In Eastern Europe borders are generally more contested than in West- ern Europe, nowhere more so than in the former Yugoslavia. Not sur- prisingly, populist radical right parties in this region express some of the most grandiose territorial ambitions. Like all Croatian nativists, the HSP- 1861 has not given up on “its historical parts” and supports “as close as possible coordination and creation of confederate or federal state com- munities between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The motto “Croatia up to river Drina, BiH up to Adriatic Sea” (HSP-1861 n.d.a: article 10) sums up the party’s vision of the true Croatian state. This Greater Croatia overlaps significantly with the utopias of other nativists, most notably the Serbs. In fact, the Greater Serbia supported by the SRS includes most of the same territory. And while HSP-1861 leader Doroboslav Paraga called for the destruction of Serbia until there is nothing left but “Belgrade and its surroundings,”
ˇ
SRS leader Vojislav Sesˇelj wanted the territory of Croatia to be reduced to “as much as one can see from the tower of the Cathedral on Zagreb” (in Irvine 1995: 149–51).
Even in relatively peaceful Bulgaria populist radical right parties espouse irredentist views. The 1994 election manifesto of the BNRP pro- claimed that “even in a United Europe the BNRP will plead for and seek ways of ethnic unification of all Bulgarians and Bulgarian lands on the basis of historical facts and arguments, thus endeavouring to stem dena- tionalization and the suppression of the Bulgarian self-consciousness” (Mitev 1997: 77). This would not be appreciated in neighboring coun- tries like Greece and Macedonia, particularly among the populist radical
́
right there. Similarly, MIEP’s irredentist demand for the reconstitution
of the sixty-four counties of Greater Hungary clashes with the ideals of nativist parties in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine, while Greater Albania utopias envisioned by parties like the Albanian Balli Kombe ̈tar (National Union) or the Kosovar Le ̈vizja Kombe ̈tare pe ̈r C ̧lirimin e Kosove ̈s (National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo) clash with nativist aspirations in Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
In some cases, irredentism seems to run counter to the nativist ideal. Zhirinovsky’sself-proclaimed“DrangnachSu ̈den”–“IdreamthatRus- sian soldiers will wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian ocean and switch to summer uniforms for good” (McCauley & Sagramoso 1994: 447) – would create a Greater Soviet Union that would make Rus-
1
2
Most parties do not (openly) demand external exclusiveness, but some
do consider their country responsible for “kin” outside of their borders.
̈
For example, the FPO wants Austria “to act as a protector for German
minorities on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy”
̈
(FPO 1997: 11, 13). Similar sentiments can also be found in nonpop-
ulist radical right parties, particularly in the postcommunist East. Virtu- ally all Hungarian political parties consider the Hungarian state to be the
- 1 Over the years Zhirinovsky’s dream state has had many different borders, although one constant has been that the preferred Russian state was always closer to the former Soviet Union than to the current Russian Federation.
- 2 Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the territory of Ruthenia has been part of Ukraine.
sians a numerical minority in their own state.
The now defunct SPR- RSC, which was the only Czech political party to keep the term “Czech- oslovak” in its party name after the split of the country in 1993, called for a Czechoslovak state including Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which had been part of the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–38) and was annexed by
ˇ
the Soviet Union after the Second World War.
that the party acknowledged the separate identities of Czechs and Slo- vaks. Indeed, the party wanted to accommodate this diversity in a new constitution that would consist of four regions: Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, Slovakia, and Subcarpathian Ruthenia (e.g. Pehe 1991).
This was despite the fact
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protectors of the Hungarian speakers in neighboring countries. The con- servative FIDESz-MPS even proposed the notorious Status Law when in government, calling for dual citizenship for “Hungarians abroad” (e.g. Ka ́ntor et al. 2004). Less far-reaching is the preferred involvement of the Danish DFP: “Outside Denmark’s borders we would like to give finan- cial, political and moral support to Danish minorities” (DFP n.d.).
The DFP also takes a remarkably moderate approach to some territo-
ries of the current Danish state. On its website the party states: “We wish
to see the Danish State Community preserved for as long as the Danish
people have a wish to do so and the Greenland and Faeroese peoples wish to ̈
to grant the power of choice to those “Austrians” currently outside of
the state: “There must remain the possibility of South Tyrol to join the
Republic of Austria in a free exercise of its right to self-determination”
̈
(FPO 1997: 13).
6.2.2 Ethnocracy: the art of the possible
The concept of ethnocracy has been around for at least three decades, although it was originally used mainly as a derogatory term (Yiftachel 2000). It has been applied with reference to multiethnic (nominal) democracies – including Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and, most notably, Israel (e.g. Yiftachel 2000, 1998; Butenschøn 1993). In recent years the term ethnocracy has been employed with reference to various new post- communist democracies (e.g. Smith 1999) and populist radical right par- ties (e.g. Betz & Johnson 2004; Griffin 1999a; Mostov 1999).
Because of the particular cultural and historical context of certain regions of Eastern Europe, notably the Balkans and Baltics, ethnocratic ideas were widespread among both the elites and the masses during the period of transition. In fact, in the early 1990s it was often impossible to make a clear distinction between the “mainstream” and the populist radical right on this issue. Various new states officially installed ethno- cratic regimes; paradoxically building in part on the Soviet tradition of “titular nations” (e.g. Beissinger 2002). In these “ethnic democracies” the populist radical right parties were part of the political mainstream and among the staunchest supporters of the system.
remain in the Community (DFP n.d.; my italics). The FPO is only willing
A good example of such an ethnic democracy was Estonia in the 3
early 1990s (e.g. Melvin 2000; Smith 1999; Smith et al. 1994). With
3 ThesituationwasquitesimilarintheneighboringstateofLatvia.However,itisincorrect to speak of a “Baltic model,” as Lithuania, the third Baltic state, did not follow the ethnocratic model.
a Russian-speaking population of around 40 percent at the time of inde- pendence in 1991, the Estonian elite introduced a Citizenship Law based on the so-called “restorationist principle,” which granted automatic citi- zenship only to citizens of the First Estonian Republic (1918–1940) and their descendants. The rest of the population, roughly one-third, were regarded as Russian citizens, who had the choice between leaving Esto- nia for their “homeland” Russia (the preferred option even though many had been born and raised in Estonia), and applying for residence and work permits in Estonia. Although the 1992 Citizenship Law did not restrict citizenship exclusively to Estonian speakers, for example some 80,000 Russian speakers got automatic citizenship, nevertheless it did lead to the complete political dominance of Estonian speakers.
The naturalization process has been seriously revised since then, not least because of EU pressure, but important ethnocratic elements persist within Estonian democracy today. In the early 1990s the ethnic model of Estonian democracy was supported by all relevant Estonian parties; par- ties of the Russian speakers were not politically viable because their nat- ural electorate was excluded from citizenship. Not surprisingly, nativist and populist radical right organizations have been among the most vocal opponents of the liberalization of the Estonian ethnocracy. Within the first postcommunist government (1992–95) leading members of both the national-conservative Isamaa (Fatherland) and the populist radical right Eesti Rahvusliku So ̃ltumatuse Partei (Estonian National Independence Party, ERSP) would vehemently defend the strict Citizenship Law and voice strongly xenophobic anti-Russian statements. Outside of govern- ment, calls for an even stricter ethnic policy, e.g. exclusion of all Russian speakers from Estonia, came from small populist radical right parties like the Eesti Rahvuslaste Keskliit (Estonian Central Union of Nationalists) and Parem Eesti (Better Estonia).
Since the mid 1990s, populist radical right parties have not been elec- torally relevant in Estonia, although some of their former leaders are active within more mainstream parties such as the Isamaaliit (Father- land Union), into which the ERSP largely integrated, and the Eestimaa Rahvaliit (Estonian People’s Union) (see Poleshchuk 2005). Moreover, the “second generation” of Estonian populist radical rightists, notably the Eesti Iseseisvuspartei (Estonian Independence Party), is more con- cerned with the perceived threat from the West, i.e. the EU and NATO, than from the East, i.e. the Russian bear and its citizens in Estonia (see Kasekamp 2003).
But ethnocracies are not limited to unstable regions (afar) or new coun- tries in the East. The most pure form of ethnocracy was the South African apartheid regime, a complex legal and political system of discrimination
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and segregation, which guaranteed the “white” minority complete dom- inance over the majority “black” and “colored” populations. Another important example of a state with strong ethnocratic elements was the Federal Republic of Germany, before the recent change in citizenship laws from an exclusive ius sanguinis to a combination with ius soli (Wimmer 2002; Brubaker 1992). Not surprisingly, populist radical right parties in those countries were among the most loyal supporters of the legal system (and the most ardent opponents of changes).
In most European countries the nativist goal of a monocultural state and the contemporary reality of a multicultural society create significant problems for the populist radical right. Like many within the populist radical right party family, the Croatian HSP-1861 deals with this tension by stressing different and contradictory goals with no regard for their apparent incongruity. While in article 8 of its basic principles the party “supports the protection of the rights of the minority groups,” in article 11 it considers that “every acknowledgement of the constitutional right to any other ethnic group in the Republic of Croatia is contrary to the interests and aspirations of the Croatian people” (HSP-1861 n.d.).
The underlying idea of article 11, i.e. that a democratic nation-state belongs to one ethnic group and that other ethnic groups can only live there if they accept this group’s dominance, is a prime example of “national preference,” the guiding principle of all populist radical right parties and the basis of ethnocratic rule. It comes pretty close to George Orwell’s famous dictum from his classic work Animal Farm: all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others. While the par- ties stress the legal equality and protection of all citizens, they also clearly stress the predominance of their own nationals. Throughout the conti- nent, populist radical right parties stress that their country should be first and foremost for “our nation”: the Belgian VB uses the slogan “Eigen volk eerst!” (Own people first!), the French FN “Les Franc ̧ais d’abord!” (The French first!), and Spain 2000 “Los espan ̃oles primero!” (The Spanish first).
The second key feature of ethnocracy in the programs of most populist radical right parties is an ethnic Leitkultur (leading culture). For nativists culture is an essentialist and rigid category; it must be preserved and cul- tivated, while adaptation and relativism are believed to lead to decline and ultimately death. While various minorities can be accommodated within the state, there can be only one official national culture. The Danish DFP expresses this as follows: “Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, developing only along the lines of Danish culture” (DFP n.d.: my ital- ics). Consequently, populist radical right parties reject multiculturalism and instead proclaim the strengthening of the “own” culture a national priority.
Today almost all populist radical rightists accept the possibility of assimilation of nonnationals, usually referred to (incorrectly) by the less negative term “integration.” Few are as open-minded and accommo- dating as the British Veritas party, however, which states in its General Election Manifesto: “We believe in a society of many colours, many faiths and many ethnic backgrounds – but one culture” (Veritas 2005a). While few parties explicitly mention color or race, there is a tacit understanding that the own nation is white. Also, some parties still distinguish between European and non-European foreigners, arguing that the former share a kind of meta-culture and can therefore assimilate, whereas the latter have no cultural affinity with the host nation (and preferably state) and thus have no business residing there. Others have given up on this distinction, forced by the reality of large numbers of “third generation non-European immigrants.” Instead, they have started to distinguish primarily upon the basis of religion, arguing that Islam is incompatible with liberal democ- racy or “European civilization” and that Muslims can therefore never assimilate into the host nation (except when they give up Islam).
Populist radical right parties further oppose special facilities for cultural minorities, which they consider hindrances for assimilation and hotbeds of fundamentalism. In recent years, the most strident demands to elimi- nate state protection and support of cultural pluralism have been directed toward the Muslim community. For example, the VB wants to revoke the official recognition of Islamic honorary services and drastically limit the number of mosques, in a claimed effort to fight back Muslim fundamen- talism and ghetto-building (e.g. Dewinter 1992). Similarly, the BNRP called the plan of the Bulgarian government to include Turkish in the school curriculum “betrayal of national interests” (in Perry 1991: 7). The most notable exceptions have been support for facilities to help minori- ties “return” to their homeland, which has been proposed mainly with regard to refugees and guest workers (e.g. Dewinter 1992).
6.3 Authoritarian democracy: follow the rules!
For the populist radical right, order is the basis of freedom. It believes that society should be structured according to strict rules and that the rule of law should be upheld at all costs. From a policy perspective this leads not only to an extensive focus on law and order, but also to ascribing an important role to the state in installing “crucial values” such as authority, compliance, order, and respect (e.g. Altemeyer 1981). Whereas most populist radical right parties are careful not to cross the line between
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democracy and dictatorship, they do regard contemporary democracies as too soft and weak, incapable of defending themselves against the many threats that lie within and beyond their borders.
The key issue of the authoritarian program of the populist radical right is the fight against crime through “an uncompromising (kompromissloses) approach against criminals” (SVP 2003: 44). In this regard, many parties call for a “zero tolerance” policy on crime, inspired by the experiences in New York under former Mayor Rudolf Giuliani. All parties want more policemen, with better equipment and salaries, less red tape, and greater competence. They also want policemen to regain their high standing in society, though the parties normally do not indicate how this is to be achieved. In the words of the German DVU, “[t]o ensure the security of the citizens, we need a police that is capable to act and sufficiently equipped, that should no longer be whipping boys [Pru ̈gelknaben] of a failed politics” (n.d.: point 8).
The populist radical right further calls for a significant strengthening of the independence of the judiciary and police force. They want both institutions to be free from (party) political influence. Regarding the judi- ciary, many parties claim that the judges are politically appointed and thus serve their partisan political masters, while the police are seen as being hindered in their work by political correctness and lack of political backup because of the cowardice of the established parties. In the words of the Czech Republicans’ 1996 election program, “[t]he current cor- rupted government garniture with its degenerated ‘humanistic’ attitude toward criminals is neither willing nor able to ensure an honest citizen’s safety and to protect his property” (in Dvorˇa ́kova ́ & Rataj 2006).
Other frequently expressed calls relate to the elaboration and trans- formation of the prison system and citizens’ right to self-defense. Most parties will call for the building of more prisons, with prescription that they be (more) basic and impose a strict(er) regime – e.g. no television sets in the cells, no social services, multiple persons per cell. Somewhat paradoxically, given their stress on the state’s monopoly of violence, sev- eral populist radical right parties defend citizens’ right to bear and use arms. Obviously, this is a huge issue in the US, where the Constitution’s Second Amendment is one of the most contested issues in politics (largely because of the powerful lobby of the National Rifle Association), but some European parties also support this right, despite the lack of tradition in the region.
The right to bear arms is most important to populist radical right par- ties in Switzerland, the only European country with a tradition in this respect. Several members of the highly fragmented Swiss populist radical right party family are strongly opposed to any limitations on the right to bear arms; at least for the Swiss population, certain limitations on the right
of foreigners are actually encouraged (see FPS 2003). In Britain the BNP has defended the issue in almost American terms: “The Armed People – the ultimate protection against invasion or tyranny” (BNP 2005). And in Italy, the LN initiated a controversial law, passed in January 2006, which gives Italians the right to shoot in “self-defense” at intruders in businesses and homes (De Tijd 26/01/2006). Similar proposals have been put forward recently by the VB in Belgium.
Another authoritarian claim of the populist radical right party family
is captured well by the Swedish SD: “We want to help the victims –
not protect the criminals” (SD 2005). For the populist radical right,
“the protection of society must rate higher than the rehabilitation of the
̈
criminal” (FPO 1997: 19). The claim is that the current legal system is
excessively focused on understanding and rehabilitating the perpetrator at
ˇ
the expense of the victim; what the Czech SPR-RSC disapprovingly refers
to as the “humanization of imprisonment” (in Dvorˇa ́kova ́ & Rataj 2006). For the populist radical right the victim, defined as both the individual(s) concerned and society as a whole, should be at the center of the legal system.
Consequently, they advocate tougher laws and increased sentences. Moreover, they want to eliminate all laws that ensure early release, partic- ularly when it is not conditioned upon the good behavior of the prisoner. The BNP (2005) goes so far as to demand that “[c]riminals should be made to serve their full sentences, with time added for bad behaviour.” The ultimate sentence varies across parties. Many members of the pop- ulist radical right party family call for the (re-)introduction of the death
́ˇ
penalty (e.g. Ataka, HF, LAOS, MIEP, NS, SPR-RSC), while only a few
̈
parties are openly against capital punishment (e.g. FPO, REP). Several
do not mention the issue in their election manifestos (e.g. DVU, LPR, SVP), sometimes because they are internally divided on the issue (e.g. VB, Veritas). Interestingly, the British Veritas party states:
We have no ‘party line’ on ‘issues of conscience’, like the death penalty, abortion, euthanasia, and fox-hunting. On these issues, we invite voters to question their VERITAS candidate on where he or she stands. Our candidates will give a truthful answer. In Parliament, we would allow a free vote on these controversial issues. (Veritas 2005b)
For most of the parties that do not support capital punishment, life
imprisonment is the ultimate penalty. However, they do demand that
̈
“[l]ife imprisonment must mean what it says” (FPO 1997: 19).
The maximum penalty is demanded with regard to two crimes in particular: selling and smuggling drugs, and engaging in terrorism. For many parties, drugs are the scourge of contemporary (youth) society and should be fought by all means. The parties, and particularly their youth
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movements, campaign tirelessly against any attempt to tolerate or legalize drugs – including the differentiation between “soft” and “hard” drugs, which is considered misleading (alcohol is excluded, obviously). In these campaigns, drugs are related to all “ills” of the current age: immigra- tion, insecurity, progressiveness, teenage sex. A number of parties call for forced detoxification for junkies and the death penalty for (major) drug dealers (e.g. BNP, CP’86). However, a few others want to combine policies of liberalization and repression by supporting free distribution of drugs to junkies under medical observation to minimize their crimes and the consequent insecurity of the citizens (e.g. Agir n.d.).
Despite the populist radical right’s emphasis on the protection of the rule of law in theory, there are reasons to doubt their commitment to it in practice. While in power, populist radical right parties have shown their authoritarian face. Without exception they have introduced, or tried to introduce, legislation that would both extend the list of criminal offences and increase the punishments to be meted out. In most cases the targeted “criminals” were not so much external enemies of the “own nation,” but those within it, most notably political opponents. From Austria to Romania and from Croatia to Italy bills were introduced with clear intent to stifle internal political opposition (e.g. Pelinka 2005; Kelley 2004). In some cases they also targeted foreign opponents; for example, the SNS demanded the proscription of the Soros Foundation from operating in Slovakia after the Hungarian-born American philanthropist George Soros openly criticized the Slovak government (Cibulka 1999).
The parties often attacked their political opposition indirectly, through legislation allegedly defending “the State.” A good example of this was the “draconian Law for the Security of the Republic” (Cibulka 1999: 119), which the SNS submitted to the Slovak parliament in 1995. In its original form, the law would have rendered virtually every critique of the Slovak government a criminal offence, thus making normal political opposition an extremely dangerous affair. Similar laws have been pro- posed and passed by other governments with populist radical right partic- ipation. In all these cases the laws meant a serious infringement of various fundamental freedoms, including those that, when in opposition, the pop- ulist radical right always champions (e.g. demonstration, press, speech). Thomas Johansson, chairman of the small Swedish Nationaldemokra- terna (National Democrats), has summarized this type of instrumentalist approach to freedom of speech as follows: “We must have an open and free debate, but it must be combined with discipline and national loyalty” (Johansson n.d.).
The populist radical right considers the internal opposition of “non- nationals,” most notably “ethnic” (and sometimes religious) minorities, another big danger. As discussed above, they have great difficulties with the whole concept of minority rights within “their” state, while many at the same time call for protective rights of their own kin in neighboring countries. The Czech RMS states that it “will not tolerate the existence of so-called Gypsy political parties, which are solely parties of a single ethnic group” (in Report 2000). The VB is strongly opposed to Mus- lim mobilization and called for a ban of the tiny but notoriously militant Arab nationalist annex Islamic fundamentalist Arabisch-Europese Liga (Arab European League), while simultaneously campaigning for “real” freedom of speech, in reaction to the court case that led to the effective banning of the Vlaams Blok and the consequent founding of the Vlaams Belang (e.g. Erk 2005).
Intolerance towards ethnic mobilization and rights is particularly strong
in countries with (sizeable) minorities from former occupying countries.
Here, the populist radical right supports the prohibition of all political
parties that are “overtly or covertly organized on a minority basis” (HF in
Kolovos 2003: 55). In fact, the Macedonian Dvizˇenje za Semakedonska
Akcija (Movement for All-Macedonian Action) has demanded the out-
lawing of all Albanian parties because of their alleged threat to the con-
stitution (Bugajski 1994: 114), while the Romanian PRM has regularly
pushed for the banning of the “anti-Romanian organization UDMR” (in
4
Particularly after 9/11, populist radical right parties have increased their authoritarian stance on Islam and the Muslim community. Most European countries have reacted to the terrorist attacks in New York (and later Madrid and London) by introducing far-reaching antiterrorist measures (e.g. Haubrich 2003). Several of these measures at least partly target the (radical) Muslim community, but the populist radical right has denounced them as too little, too late. Parties like the VB and LN have called for strict(er) controls of mosques and Islamic centers and even the closing of the borders for Muslim immigrants (e.g. Betz 2003a). In a clear reference to “Muslim fundamentalists,” the BNP (2004) argues that “any immigrants who have the audacity to preach hatred of our society should be deported – no prolonged appeals procedures; no expensive legal aid at our expense – just deported.”
4 In many Eastern European countries such claims are not without legal basis, given that constitutions often have a nativist element to them. For example, Article 1.1 of the Roma- nian Constitution states that “Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary, and indi- visible National State,” while Article 4.1 elaborates that “The foundation of the State is based on the unity of the Romanian people” (Andreescu 2005: 195).
Shafir 1996: 96).
“the activity of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia must be outlawed” (in Zitny 1998: 38).
SNS leader Slota even went so far as to demand that
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In the tumultuous early period of postcommunism, some populist rad- ical right leaders clearly left the realm of democracy and entered the terrain of dictatorship. Vadim Tudor, the “righteous” (justi ̧tiar) leader of the Romanian PRM, called for a two-year period of authoritarian rule to make Romania (again) into a country of “unity in abundance” (in Shafir 1997: 392). And the even more erratic Zhirinovsky said in the same period, despite his party’s official support for liberal democracy: “In a multiethnic state like Russia the form of government of parliamentarism remains a utopia, and a life-threatening one for all ethnic communities (Vo ̈lker) at that . . . Russia can only be saved by a dictatorship” (Zhiri- novsky 1992: 30).
The populist radical right party family is highly divided with respect to militarism (also Mudde 2000a, 1995a). There are some parties that espouse traditional militaristic values or call for the building of a large(r) and strong(er) national army (e.g. DVU, LDPR). The LAOS even wants Greece to “gradually become a nuclear power” (in Kolovos 2003: 66). However, particularly within Western Europe many parties are not propo- nents of militarism or are even antimilitaristic. This is particularly strong in countries and regions where, for historical reasons, nationalism and pacifism are interlinked, such as Flanders and Germany.
Most parties support compulsory military service, although some
̈
oppose it (e.g. FPO) or accept a more general social service (e.g. REP).
Rather than being an expression of militarism, compulsory military ser- vice is seen as a civic duty, i.e. as both an individual’s opportunity and a state’s necessity. In the words of the German REP:
Military service, also in the form of a general compulsory military service, is a command of a democracy correctly understood. [A person] who has the right to decide with others upon the fate of the state in elections, votes and freedom of speech, has fundamentally the duty to participate in the protection of the state. Military service is service to our country, to our ethnic community [Volk], to our liberal state, and to the maintenance of peace. (REP 1983: X)
For many parties the protection of the state entails not only a military struggle against an external enemy, but a cultural and political struggle against an internal enemy as well. In this respect, they speak of ideological and practical vigilance against “subversive actions” and “antinational ele- ments” within their “own state” (e.g. communists, Islamists). This is also to be achieved by the (re)creation of a national esprit civique (Agir n.d.).
6.4 Populist democracy: power to the (own) people!
Recent years have seen an explosion in literature on populism, much of it stressing the tense relationship between populist democracy and liberal democracy (e.g. Me ́ny & Surel 2002a; Taggart 2000; Canovan 1999). A core element of populist democracy is the belief that the volonte ́ ge ́ne ́rale should be implemented without any restrictions. Nothing is more impor- tant than the general will of the people. This applies not only to politicians and political institutions like parties, parliament and governments, but also to laws and even to the constitution.
As populism is essentially a monist ideology, it is inherently opposed to division and pluralism. In Europe’s democracies, which are first and foremost party democracies (Gallagher et al. 2005), the main tar- gets are established political parties. In line with the populist radical right’s revisionist rather than revolutionary creed, Haider stated, obvi- ously before his party entered the Austrian government, “there exists no alternative to democracy, but there very well exist alternatives to the ruling parties” (Probst 2003: 120). The populist radical right does not merely want to change the players, however; they also want to change some rules of the game. The Spanish DN has expressed in extreme terms, and poor English, what most (larger) populist radical right par- ties voice more moderately: “The big parties monopoly over political life is to be broken . . . Same opportunities for every party. Creation of new ways of political representation to enhance the existents. Referen- dum and popular initiative to hold elections must be promoted” (DN n.d.). In essence, populist democracy is based upon three key features: plebiscitary politics, personalization of power, and primacy of the political.
6.4.1 Plebiscitary politics
One of the crucial claims of the populist radical right is expressed by Le Pen’s mantra “rendre la parole au peuple” (return the word to the peo- ple). According to all populist radical right parties, with the temporary exception of those in government, the contemporary political system in their country is not really democratic. They claim that the political elite (in the singular) controls all power through the system of representative government and the practice of cartelization. Only through the introduc- tion of elements of plebiscitary democracy can power be given (back) to “the people.”
Plebiscitarianism is one of many ideological approaches to democratic repre- sentation. It purports to radically curtail the distortion and mediation of citizen preferences by compromised political organizations, offering to substitute direct connections between the people and the policies or social results they seek. These direct connections are the recall, the initiative and the referendum. (Barney & Laycock 1999: 318)
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The most popular instrument of plebiscitary democracy is the referen- dum. Virtually all populist radical right parties call for its introduction or increased use. While matters pertaining to national sovereignty in partic- ular are considered to be legitimized only through referendums, notably with regard to European integration, most parties want every major (and sometimes even minor) decision to be potentially scrutinized by “the voice of the people.” The Bulgarian Ataka even created an objective, numerical cut-off point: issues that concern at least 10 percent of the people could be subject to a referendum (Ataka 2005).
Many parties will go a step further and support (the introduction of) a people’s initiative, i.e. a bottom-up version of the referendum. Being fundamentally suspicious of the political elites, they want the power to decide upon the use of the referendum to lie with the people, not with the government or parliament. In essence, the parties want the people to have the right to call for a referendum on practically any issue. They see the people’s initiative as “a construction kit for detours around cor- rupt policy intersections, clogged and fouled by parties and organized interests” (Barney & Laycock 1999: 319).
The formal requirements of these initiatives tend to be set quite low, although many parties do not go into details in their discussion of them. One of the exceptions is the British BNP, which has developed a radical bottom-up model.
Accordingly, we propose as a vital check and balance on the political class the introduction of Citizens’ Initiative Referenda on the Swiss model. Under this, individual citizens only have to collect the requisite number of electors’ signatures on any given petition – the wording of which they decide themselves – in order to compel either the local or national government to hold a referendum on the subject.
If passed by between 50%–66% [sic] of those voting, such a referendum result would in turn trigger a full-scale council/parliamentary debate on the subject, with heavy moral pressure on the politicians to follow the wishes of the majority. If passed by more than 66% of those voting, however, the result of such a refer- endum would automatically be binding on the authorities, who would have no choice but to accept the will of the people and enact their wishes as law. (BNP 2005)
In countries that already allow for referendums, populist radical right parties have been active initiators. This is true most notably for the Swiss SVP; leader Blocher even founded a separate movement to mobi- lize around referendums, the Aktionsgemeinschaft fu ̈r eine unabha ̈ngige und neutrale Schweiz (Action Society for an Independent and Neutral
̈ Switzerland, AUNS). Similarly, the Austrian FPO launched
a series of people’s initiatives, each designed to highlight one of its core issues:
party patronage and privileges (1987), the ‘foreigners question’ (1993), and the
̈ ̈ public broadcasting system, which the FPO portrays as a domain of the SPO and
̈ ̈
OVP (1989). The FPO promoted its third core issue, its anti-EU stand, in two
initiatives (both 1997) which followed the obligatory constitutional referendum
on allowing Austria’s accession to the EU . . . With the exception of the public
̈
broadcasting system, all the FPO’s initiative issues struck a responsive chord in
the mass public. (Mu ̈ller 1999: 311)
̈
Some parties also support some form of recall. The FPO, for instance,
argues that “[p]remature removal from office either of the federal pres-
ident, [or] provincial governors or mayors should be possible in a refer-
endum after a qualified initiative from the relevant parliament or munic-
̈
ipality” (FPO 1997: 17). And the Bulgarian Ataka wants to create the
possibility of the recall of MPs who do not do what they promise, based on a petition of voters (Ataka 2005).
There seems to be some regional variation with regard to support for
plebiscitary democratic initiatives within the populist radical right party
family. While nearly all family members in the West, including extra-
European territories, put the introduction and the use of these measures
at the center of their propaganda, and base much of their political argu-
mentation on plebiscitarianism, there are various Eastern parties that do
not put much emphasis on it (e.g. LPR, Slovak SNS). However, as is
so often the case, the intra-European divide is not complete; parties like
́
Ataka, MIEP, and PRM do support plebiscitary initiatives, and for those
ˇ
like the NS and SPR-RSC they are even quite central to their program.
6.4.2 Personalization of power
While there is an element of truth in the statement “direct democracy and populism meet in their fundamental aversion of the principle of repre- sentation and intermediate bodies” (Puhle 2003: 26), this does not mean they are inherently at odds with liberal democracy. Moreover, rather than being against representation per se, populists are primarily against repre- sentation by the wrong people, i.e. “the corrupt elite” (Mudde 2004). Because of the intrinsic monism of populism, any form of political plu- ralism is treated with suspicion. This is also the basis of its aversion to intermediate bodies, which are generally seen as artificial divisions or representatives of “special interests.” The monism of the populist radi- cal right is particularly visible in its call for a more personalized political system.
Most populist radical right parties call for an increase of the powers of the main political figure in their system, be it the president (e.g. EK, FN,
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NS, REP) or the premier (e.g. CD, LN). Some parties even call for the
introduction of a (super)presidential system, in which the president cen- ˇ
ˇ
tem like in France” (SPR-RSC 1999).
̈
However, a party like the FPO calls for the popular election of “provin-
cial governors or mayors as well as administrative heads of the relevant
territorial legal entities,” on the one hand, but wants “to enhance the
̈ National Assembly vis-a`-vis the executive,” on the other (FPO 1997:
16–17). Regarding the latter, the party demands the introduction of the parliament’s right to elect the cabinet and to have an effective no confi- dence vote, as well as the abolition of “governmental legislation.”
6.4.3 Primacy of the political
A key notion of populist democracy is the primacy of the political. As elaborated in chapter 5, for the populist radical right party family, politics clearly has primacy over the economy. However, in the populist ideology the will of the people cannot be limited by anything, not even the law. “From the populist point of view, legalism and the rule of law hinder the full realization of the rule of the people” (Blokker 2005: 382).
There are some clear examples of European populists expressing this
opinion. For example, Andrzej Lepper, leader of the social populist
Samoobrona, has stated forcefully: “If the law works against people and
generally accepted notions of legality then it isn’t law. The only thing to
do is to break it for the sake of the majority” (in Maryniak 2002: 103).
Similarly, FI leader and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has regu-
larly questioned the authority of the Milan judges (“red robes”) to convict
him, arguing that they represented no one, whereas he himself was the
voice of the people (e.g. Ruscino 2002). A somewhat similar argument
has been used by leaders of the Belgian VB; after gaining another elec-
toral victory a few months after its conviction for inciting racial hatred,
the party proclaimed that it had been “convicted by a Belgian judge,
5
the judiciary to the will of the people does not feature in much of the official party literature. Most parties rather stress the importance of a politically independent judiciary; in most cases the populist radical right
tralizes and personalizes the vox populi (e.g. HSP, KPN, LPR, SPR-RSC). Not all populist radical right parties are well versed in political systems. The Czech Republicans called for the introduction of a directly elected president with more powers, which they presented as “a presidential sys-
acquitted by the Flemish voter” (my italics).
However, with the exception of some slogans, the subordination of
5 NotealsothatthereferenceistoaBelgianjudge,yettotheFlemishvoter.
faces a fairly hostile political environment and it believes that the judiciary is controlled by its political opponents. Yet, once in power the populist radical right has been less supportive of this independence. In fact, they have strongly criticized unfavorable judicial rulings and tried to curtail the judiciary’s independence and power by introducing new laws or by appointing partisan judges (e.g. Kelley 2004; Ruscino 2002).
6.5 Populist radical right democracy vs. liberal democracy
Populist radical right democracy is a combination of nativist, authori- tarian, and populist democracy. While no party calls for a pure populist radical right democracy, and probably no two family members defend an identical form of democracy, the whole party family supports an ethno- cratic regime with strong authoritarian and plebiscitary elements. This essentially monist interpretation of democracy is at odds with some fun- damental aspects of liberal democracy.
It is obvious that a nativist democracy, whether based upon forced monoculturalism or ethnocracy, opposes key elements of liberal democ- racy, most notably the protection of minorities and the centrality of individual rights. Regarding its authoritarianism, no inherent contradic- tions exist, but in practice various parties push the limits of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) in favor of a state of security (Sicherheitsstaat) (Mudde 2006). Convinced that the nation is under an imminent threat from aliens (varying from immigrants to Islamic terrorists), the populist radical right believes that the state should no longer be obstructed in its defensive actions by principles like the right to privacy or legal counsel.
The relationship between populist democracy and liberal democracy is somewhat more subtle. Many authors will agree that “[a] plebiscitarian approach to direct democracy might [thus] easily undermine rather than support the democratic cultural goods (tolerance, compromising skills, other-regarding perspectives) produced through deliberative representa- tional practices” (Barney & Laycock 1999: 334; also Abts & Rummens 2005). Referendums are also believed to weaken political parties and fragment party systems, thus undermining key institutions of contempo- rary democracies. However, empirical proof for these assertions is hard to come by (e.g. Ladner & Braendle 1999). Similarly, the critique that personalization of power leads to antiliberal regimes, as has happened in Latin America (e.g. Werz 2003b), ignores the fact that various strong liberal democracies with powerful political leaders exist within Europe (e.g. Britain and France).
Most problematic is the radical interpretation of the primacy of the political, particularly with respect to the judiciary. Within the populist
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idea the “general will” of the people is the basis of democracy and cannot be limited by anything. Consequently, populists will defend an extreme form of majoritarian democracy, in which minority rights can exist only as long as the majority supports them. Similarly, constitutional pro- visions are valid only as long as they have majority support. While these aspects are generally not expressed in the party literature – which in fact rather stresses the opposite (political independence of the judiciary) – the practice shows that once in power the populist radical right clearly fol- lows these ideas (see also 12.3). This has led to some serious (attempts at) infringements of constitutionally protected liberal rights (e.g. in Austria, Croatia, Italy, and Slovakia).
As a general rule then, we can conclude that populist radical right democracy is fundamentally at odds with liberal democracy because of its monism, most strongly expressed in its nativism and populism. Con- sequently, the more liberal a democracy is, the more antisystem the pop- ulist radical right will be. Similarly, we can posit that the more ethnic and plebiscitary a democracy, the more pro-system the populist radical right. Hence the strong support for the constitution of populist radical right parties in Croatia, Estonia, Germany (until the revision), Israel, Switzerland, or Turkey. This again shows that if one wants to use the term populist radical right in a (nearly) universal way, i.e. not limiting it to liberal democracies, the antisystem criteria cannot be included in the definition (cf. Ignazi 2003).
This leads us to the normative question: how dangerous is the populist radical right? Various authors have argued that populist democracy in general is non- or even antidemocratic (Abts & Rummens 2005). How- ever, this is only accurate if the term democracy is used exclusively for the subtype liberal democracy; which is what most authors also implicitly or explicitly do. Similarly, the argument that the populist radical right is antipolitical holds only for certain (liberal) definitions of politics (cf. Schedler 1997). In fact, one could equally argue that the populist radical right is extremely political, in the sense that it believes in the primacy of politics over all other forces, including economics and history (e.g. Decker 2004).
Another popular view, particularly among scholars of and from Eastern Europe, holds that the populist radical right might not constitute a major challenge to the established democracies in the West, but does represent a fundamental threat to the fragile new democracies in the postcommunist East (e.g. Thieme 2005; Bayer 2002). According to some authors, this is at least in part a result of the greater strength of the populist radical right in the East. Josef Bayer has posited that “[r]adical right parties are fringe phenomena in Western democracies, whereas they are used as possible smaller coalition partners or majority providers in Central and Eastern Europe” (2002: 267). A quick look at the situation in the two parts of Europe quickly disproves this statement: while no populist radical right party provides government support in the East in January 2006, three Western European countries have parties from this family in government (Austria, Italy, and Switzerland).
A more convincing argument is based on the allegedly weaker demo- cratic culture of postcommunist countries. Istva ́n Gyarmati, senior vice- president of the East-West Institute and a former Hungarian deputy defense minister, has expressed this view forcefully:
There is a general trend in Europe which is the re-emergence of the extreme right, as various radical elements look for solutions outside the system . . . But in Central Europe, this is more dangerous than in Western Europe, because in Central Europe, democratic thinking and the democratic public are not quite so stable. (New York Times 12/05/2002)
While his view is broadly shared within the academic literature, the empir- ical evidence does not fully substantiate this claim either (Mudde 2005b). Inter-regional differences in terms of democratic quality do exist, but they are not always larger than intra-regional variations. For example, it is debatable whether in terms of “democratic thinking” Estonia or Slovenia have more in common with Bulgaria or Romania than with Finland or Austria (e.g. Pollack et al. 2003; Plasser et al. 1998).
In conclusion then, while the populist radical right does not consti- tute a fundamental challenge to the democratic procedural system itself, clear tensions exist between its interpretation of democracy and liberal democracy. On various fundamental procedures and values, populist rad- ical right democracy and liberal democracy clash in both theory and practice. At the core of this tension is the distinction between monism and pluralism: whereas populist radical right democracy considers soci- eties to be essentially homogeneous collectives, liberal democracy pre- supposes societies to be made up of groups of fundamentally different individuals.
